U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
95/06/01 Report on Human Rights in Turkey and Situation in Cyprus
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses
by the Turkish Military
And on the Situation in Cyprus
This report is submitted in compliance with the
congressional requirement as set forth in public law 103-306
- August 23, 1994. It consists of two parts. The first
covers allegations of human rights abuses by the Turkish
security forces. The second covers Cyprus.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS
Table of Contents:
I. Introduction and Summary
II. Methodology
III. Background
A. The Role of the PKK
B. GOT View of the Conflict
C. Kurds in Turkey
IV. Turkish Security Forces in Anti-PKK Operations
A. Numbers and Types of Forces
B. Chain of Command and Function
C. Code of Conduct
V. Activities of Turkish Security Forces in Anti-PKK
Operations
A. Engaging PKK Guerrillas in Towns
B. Village Evacuations/Burnings
C. Extrajudicial Killings and Disappearances
VI. Torture and Intimidation
A. Military/Jandarma Involvement in Torture
B. The Broader Problem of Torture
VII. Use of U.S.-Origin Equipment
VIII. Steps Being Taken by the GOT To Improve the Human
Rights Situation
A. Human Rights Training
B. Anti-Torture Measures
C. Freedom of Expression and Democracy
IX. Conclusion
X Annexes:
Annex I: TGS Responses to Specific Allegations
Annex II-A: Turkish General Staff Code of Conduct for
Operations in the southeast
Annex II-B: Turkish General Staff Guidelines for "Operation
Steel" in Northern Iraq
ANNEX III: Village Evacuations
I. Introduction and Summary
This report is submitted to the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees in accordance with Title III of the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of FY 1995 (Public Law
103-306), which requests the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to address allegations of human
rights abuses against civilians by the Turkish armed forces.
The report provides an overview of the decade-long conflict
between Turkey and the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),
describes the types and organization of Turkish security forces
combatting the PKK and addresses reports of alleged human rights
violations by these forces, including the possible involvement of
U.S.-supplied military equipment.
In preparing this report the Department of State, in
coordination with the Department of Defense, has drawn on a
variety of sources, including U.S. government reporting,
information from NGOs, press reports, the 1994 Human Rights
Report on Turkey and material provided by the Turkish government.
The report reaffirms Turkey's continuing importance as a
long-standing U.S. treaty ally which projects NATO and Western
values into the Middle East as well as southeastern Europe.
Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has replaced Germany as the
frontline European state. It confronts the most serious threats
to its integrity and well-being of any Western ally. Continuing
U.S. support for Turkey's security is essential.
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) presents a major threat to
Turkey's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is a ruthless
terrorist group which receives support from Syria, Iran and some
sources in Europe and has terrorized the population of southeast
Turkey and destabilized the region.
The Government of Turkey, in its struggle against the PKK has
relied primarily on a military strategy to address this internal
security matter. This strategy, which includes the evacuation
and/or destruction of many villages, has resulted in human rights
abuses and risks alienating the local population. A more
civil-based approach by the government is required to effectively
address the problem in the southeast.
Turkey, as the recipient of U.S. security assistance, has the
right to use U.S.-supplied weapons for legitimate self-defense
and for internal security. This includes use to combat terrorism
by forces such as the PKK.
U.S.-origin equipment, which accounts for most major items of
the Turkish military inventory, has been used in operations
against the PKK during which human rights abuses have occurred.
It is highly likely that such equipment was used in support of
the evacuation and/or destruction of villages. However, we have
no evidence that verifies reports of torture and extrajudicial
killings involving U.S. equipment.
The Government of Turkey has recognized the need to improve
its human rights situation and has made proposals which, if
adopted and implemented, could lead to important and positive
changes in the situation in the southeast. These proposals
include measures for the orderly phase out of the state of
emergency in the southeast and constitutional amendments to
broaden participation in the political process.
Finally the report notes that democracy and human rights are
and will continue to be a prominent feature of the ongoing
U.S.-Turkish high level dialogue. The democratization measures
recently introduced into the Turkish parliament, the new
willingness to make public the code of conduct promulgated by the
Turkish General Staff, and what appears to be the serious effort
to protect civilians during the operation in northern Iraq are
indications of the value of sustained discussion with the Turks
on the issue of human rights. The United States can and should
expect progress.
II. Methodology
In preparing this report, the Department of State has drawn
on a number of sources. These include observations drawn from
travel in southeastern Turkey; existing official reports, such as
the 1994 Country Human Rights Report for Turkey; information from
NGOs; Embassy and Consulate interviews; press reports; U.S.
government reporting and material provided by the Turkish
government. It is difficult to ascertain the real facts.
Information from many sources is biased. Also, our information
is limited by U.S. personnel constraints, security problems in
the area and restricted access to the southeast under the terms
of emergency rule. Representative accounts of abuses which we
cannot confirm are included in an annex to give a fuller sense of
public discourse on human rights abuses in the southeast.
The Embassy in Ankara, together with the Consulate in Adana,
travels frequently to Turkey's southeast in an effort to gain a
better understanding of what is happening in the region. There
was a break in this travel from May 1993 until May 1994 because
of the precarious security situation during that period. When
the security situation improved, visits to the southeast region
resumed. Before the 1994-95 winter, Embassy and Washington-based
State Department officials traveled to southeastern Turkey. In
some cases, they endeavored to obtain access to areas that were
the subject of allegations of controversial village
burning/evacuations but did not receive permission from the
government of Turkey. Embassy and Consulate officials have
resumed their travels. As in the past, such travel is dependent
on the security situation.
This report should be read in conjunction with the 1994 Human
Rights Report for Turkey, which covers a number of closely
related issues.
III. Background
A. Role of the PKK
During the past ten years, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
has waged an increasingly violent terrorist insurgency in
southeastern Turkey. Since 1984, the objective of the PKK has
been the establishment of a Kurdish state based on
Marxist-Leninist ideology in so-called "Northern Kurdistan,"
comprising 22 provinces in eastern and southeastern Turkey. At a
later stage, its objective is to realize a so-called "greater
Kurdistan" by annexing territories defined as "Kurdistan" from
Iraq, Syria and Iran. As a matter of policy, the U.S. government
firmly opposes both objectives, as well as the PKK's terrorist
means.
To achieve its aims, the PKK carries out acts of violence
directed against the lives and property of the people in the
region; tries to destroy the authority of the state in the
region; and prevents the investment necessary for the region's
social and economic development by destroying and sabotaging
existing assets. PKK violence in the southeast has included
attacks against Turkish security forces and civilians, including
unarmed military recruits and teachers. Most of the civilians
the PKK has killed are Kurds whom the PKK accuses of
collaborating with the state. The Turkish National Police,
Jandarma, and armed forces, in turn, have waged an increasingly
intense campaign to suppress terrorism, targeting persons they
believe support or sympathize with the PKK, as well as active PKK
units. In May 1993, the PKK broke its own unilateral three-month
ceasefire when it stopped a bus and massacred more than 30 young,
unarmed military recruits near Bingol in southeastern Turkey.
The estimated 10-year death toll of this conflict is 15,000.
Deaths in 1994 reached record levels. According to Turkish
government statistics, in the first 10 months of 1994, an
estimated 963 government security forces, 3,577 PKK and 940
noncombatants were killed. According to Turkish General Staff
(TGS) figures (as of March 14, 1995), since 1984 the PKK had
killed 3,515 and wounded 6,892 security personnel; killed 4,635
civilians and wounded 4,841, 117 of whom were teachers. Some
Turkish officials assert that almost all civilian casualties were
the result of terrorist raids on unprotected villages.
Statistics quoted in the English-language daily Turkish Daily
News from several sources (President, Interior Ministry,
Emergency Region Governor) calculate the casualties for all of
1994 as follows:
source: President Int. Min. Governor
------------------------------------------------------------
PKK
Killed 3,709 4,060 3,905
Injured 49 149 390
Security Forces
Killed 919 1,089 248
Injured 2,119 2,586
Civilians
Killed 814 1,062 908
Injured 1,037 1,775 1,196
In recent years the PKK has targeted Turkey's economic and
lucrative tourism infrastructure. It has attacked pipelines and
other government investments in the southeast and selectively
bombed hotels, restaurants and tourist sites and planted grenades
on beaches in Western Turkey to damage Turkey's tourism sector.
In 1993, in an apparent effort to generate publicity and
discourage tourism, it kidnapped and later released 19
Westerners, including one American, traveling in eastern Turkey.
In April 1995 it kidnapped two journalists. The PKK has also
staged attacks on dozens of Turkish diplomatic and commercial
facilities in several Western European countries where there are
large numbers of resident Turks, including many Kurds.
In addition to dealing with the resident domestic terrorism
threat, Turkish security forces face the difficulty that PKK are
trained and maintain camps in Northern Iraq, as well as in Iran.
From there they infiltrate into Turkey. For many years Syria has
harbored the leadership of the PKK. Guerrillas are trained in
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in an area under Syrian control.
B. GOT View of the Conflict
According to the GOT, Turkey is faced with illegal acts of
terror, supported and provoked by external powers as well as by
their internal collaborators. The PKK plans and carries out its
terrorist activities primarily with the support of some of
Turkey's neighbors which do not want a strong Turkey in the
region. Their basic aim is to force Turkey to expend most of its
resources on internal problems and thus prevent Turkey's
development as a regional power. Moreover, some countries see
Turkey as a potential threat and thus provide support to the PKK.
Therefore, the problem stems from the desire of some to
destabilize the region and weaken the Turkish Republic.
The GOT asserts that the main objective of its military
operations in the southeast is to protect the people in the
region from acts of PKK violence and to establish and maintain
state authority there. The GOT further expresses the intention
to achieve these goals within the rule of law and with full
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It hopes to
eliminate the conditions which necessitated the declaration of a
State of Emergency, and to create conditions for increasing the
level of social and economic development.
C. Kurds in Turkey
1. The Conflict
The Kurdish-origin population of Turkey totals an estimated
12-15 million, of whom fewer than half live in the southeastern
region of Turkey. There are also about 8 million Kurdish origin
people living in neighboring Syria, Iraq and Iran. The Kurdish
origin population has never been considered as a separate ethnic
group. The Treaty of Lausanne, which effectively ended the
Ottoman Empire, made no mention of them as a group. The sections
of that document providing for the protection of ethnic
minorities apply only to "non-Muslim minorities," which does not
include the Kurds. Many Kurds are opposed to either Kurdish
autonomy or separatism but favor increased political and cultural
self-expression.
From 1925 to 1939 there were periodic revolts in the Kurdish
regions. In response to these revolts, which the newly-formed
Turkish Republic viewed as threatening both the existence of the
still fragile state and the secular nature of that state, the
Government banned the Kurdish language, Kurdish schools and
associations, as well as publications in Kurdish and Kurdish
names and music. Kurds who assimilated into Turkish life were
accepted into the greater Turkish society. Many rose to
positions of power and authority, including President, Prime
Minister, and Foreign Minister. Currently, as many as 25 percent
of the members of the 450 seat parliament are Kurds. However,
many remained in the sparsely populated southeast where they
lived simply and spoke Kurdish among themselves.
Many Kurdish cultural activists and intellectuals, often
attracted to leftist views, found themselves either exiled or
afraid to speak out after the 1980 military coup. While
oppression was country-wide after the 1980 coup, it was
especially harsh in the southeast, particularly in Diyarbakir
prison. By the mid-1980's, those who identified themselves as
Kurds held many different opinions about what Kurds should strive
for and how to achieve their goals. These views ran the
gamut from the radical dream of a separate state to more modest
proposals for a separate cultural identity and for schools where
Kurdish is a medium of instruction. Much of the terrorism
problem and associated human rights abuses are related to one or
another of these goals and the Government's reaction to them.
In 1984 the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) began carrying out
guerrilla warfare against Turkish security forces, with the
stated aim of creating an independent "Kurdistan." Most Kurds in
the southeast do not support terrorism or the PKK. Some, however,
are sympathetic because they believe the PKK is the only voice
they have or the agent which has brought the "Kurdish situation"
onto Turkey's domestic agenda.
The military approach taken by the GOT in combatting PKK
terrorism has in some cases deepened political divisions. The
formation of local militia-type units called village guards is an
example. Now some 50,000 strong, these units are paid and armed
by the State to prevent PKK control of villages and protect the
population. The Village Guard system, however, has exacerbated
some long-standing Kurdish internecine animosities and created
difficult situations for many inhabitants.
2. Status of Actions Against Kurdish Members of Parliament
In March 1994, the Turkish Parliament, based on requests from
the State Security Court Public Prosecutor, the recommendations
of the justice and constitutional committees and the urging of
Prime Minister Ciller, voted to lift partially the parliamentary
immunity of eight Kurdish deputies: one independent, six
Democracy Party (DEP) deputies and one MP from the Islamist Refah
(Welfare) Party. This action opened the deputies to prosecution
on the specific issues for which their immunities were lifted. A
court subsequently decided that there was insufficient evidence
to press charges against one of the DEP deputies, and charges
were eventually dropped against the Refah Party MP. The
remaining five deputies and one independent were interrogated,
then placed in "preventive detention" at the Ankara Central
Prison to await trial.
In June 1994, the Constitutional Court ordered the DEP
closed. Under Article 84 of the Constitution, all MPs who were
members of the closed party at the time the investigation for the
closure suit commenced (five imprisoned MPs, plus eight others)
automatically lost their parliamentary membership.
To reinstate memberships in Parliament and hence immunity,
Parliament must amend Article 84 of the Constitution. To apply
to the former DEP parliamentarians (six are in self-imposed exile
in Europe, and most of these have associated with the PKK), this
amendment would have to be made retroactive -- a difficult task.
The DEP trial concluded on December 8, 1994, with convictions
for disseminating separatist propaganda and for supporting or
being a member of an armed band. Sentences ranged from 3 years
and 6 months (suspended) to 15 years. The Department of State
issued a statement of concern following the rendering of the
verdict.
The former DEP deputies' convictions for belonging to an
armed gang or band and knowingly assisting such a band are
currently on appeal. If the Court of Appeals ratifies the
convictions, under Article 76 of the Constitution, the former
deputies cannot be elected members of Parliament, even if the
President pardons them. The Appeals Court could overturn their
convictions and send the case back to the trial court. If all
appeals are unsuccessful, attorneys for the defendants plan to
file a petition with the European Court of Human Rights.
3. Denial of Kurdish Cultural Rights
Legislative reforms in 1991 partially removed the ban on the
use of the Kurdish language. Kurdish-language cassettes and
publications on Kurdish subjects continue to be widely available,
although instances of suppression continue as well. In April
1994, the Tunceli governorship banned the sale of 39
Kurdish-language cassettes. We are aware of only one
Kurdish-language weekly publication, Welat, that is currently
being published; its editor-in-chief was brought to court in the
spring of 1994 on charges of violating the anti-terror law.
Several other weeklies publish in a combination of Turkish and
Kurdish. Potential customers are afraid to purchase
Kurdish-language materials because possession of such items may
be interpreted as evidence of PKK sympathies. Kurdish-language
broadcasts are still illegal, although in
June 1994, Prime Minister Ciller stated that the possibility of
private broadcasting and education in languages other than
Turkish might be discussed. As of early 1995, however, the
government had taken no further action. President Demirel stated
that Kurdish television and education would constitute
concessions to terrorists and should be allowed only after the
terrorism ends. There is foreign language broadcasting (e.g.,
German, French, English) both on state-run television and radio
and on private television stations.
Under the political parties law all discussion that takes
place at political meetings must be in Turkish. Kurdish may be
spoken only in "nonpolitical communication." Court proceedings
are conducted in Turkish, disadvantaging those Kurdish-speaking
defendants who have to rely on GOT-provided translators.
Materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture and ethnic
identity continue to be subject to confiscation and prosecution
under the "indivisible unity of the state" provisions of the
Anti-Terror Law.
In addition, there are larger legal provisions which can be
applied to anyone but are often applied to Kurdish cultural
expression. The Anti-Terror Law, which provides that "written
and oral propaganda... aiming at damaging the indivisible unity
of the state of the Turkish Republic... (is) forbidden,
regardless of the method, intention and ideas behind it,"
severely restricts freedom of speech and has been used against
writers, journalists, publishers, politicians, musicians and
students. For example, Ismail Besikci, a well known writer,
served 10 years in prison between 1971 and 1987 because of his
publications on the Kurdish question in Turkey. He has been
brought to court more than 100 times and has been in prison again
since November 1993.
IV. Turkish Security Forces in Anti-PKK Operations
A. Numbers and Types of Force
There are currently some 250,000-300,000 Turkish security
forces operating in the southeast. This includes
140,0000-150,000 Turkish army, 10,000 Air Force, 40,000-50,000
Jandarma (including 10,000 special forces whose mission is to
fight the PKK in the field using counter-guerrilla deployment
tactics), 40,000 Turkish national police (TNP) and 50,000
paramilitary village guards. Of this force, an estimated 30% are
administrative or support personnel. Overall, their
responsibilities are as follows:
-- Army: The army is primarily dedicated to conducting
conventional style operations, and is the primary agent for
planning and executing major offensive actions against the
PKK in the field. It is the most professional element in the
southeast. It has the bulk of heavy equipment such as tanks,
armored personnel carriers, and artillery. In the region,
the major command elements are the Turkish Second and Third
armies, which report directly to the Turkish Land Forces
command in Ankara. The Interior Ministry, through the
Emergency Region Super Governor, has nominal control over
actions in the region, but in many cases the military has
assumed control of operations.
-- Air Force: The Air Force supports ground operations as
required, and conducts close air support and interdiction
missions as directed by the TGS. It is very much a support
service, and its air operations are closely integrated into
Army and Jandarma planning and operations.
-- Jandarma: The Jandarma fall under the control of the
Emergency Region Super Governor, but may find themselves
working under the military from time to time. A three-star
Jandarma commander, detailed from the Turkish land forces,
serves as the primary point of contact between the Jandarma
command and the Super Governor, both located in Diyarbakir.
The Jandarma are the second-most professional organization in
the region. One of the Jandarma's main missions is to patrol
and secure the main road networks in the region. Often
co-located in secure compounds with the Jandarma, the
military has cooperated with the Jandarma in joint operations
to provide greater firepower capability. The chains of
command quite often are blurred.
-- TNP: The TNP fall under the control of provincial
security directors and governors. It is primarily
responsible for security within the cities, whereas the
Jandarma is in control outside the population centers.
-- Village Guards: The GOT instituted the paramilitary
village guard program to assist Kurdish villages to protect
themselves against PKK raids. There are approximately 50,000
village guards employed in the Eastern and southeastern
region of Turkey. Each village guard is paid a monthly wage
of five million Turkish Lira (USD 125) -- a high salary in
the southeast. Although a thorn in the side of the PKK,
village guards have also been implicated in human rights
abuses. They have sometimes used their influence with
Security forces to depict other Kurdish clans as PKK
supporters in order to gain the upper hand for themselves.
They have also on occasion used their government-issued
weapons to settle blood feuds with rivals. While village
guards are sometimes used by other security force elements in
joint operations, they are generally considered the least
disciplined force in the southeast.
B. Chain of Command and Function
According to the Turkish General Staff, all security forces,
including the army, operate in the Emergency Region under the
authority of the Emergency Region Super Governor. The Super
Governor in turn answers to the Interior Ministry and functions
as a representative of civil authority. The struggle against PKK
terrorism, therefore, is primarily an internal security matter.
Since most PKK activity occurs in the countryside, the onus of
the day-to-day anti-terror campaign falls on the Jandarma, and
army units are called upon for larger operations when their
professional capabilities are required.
Jandarma and reinforcing army units are mainly responsible
for border control; control and security of roads; protection of
critical installations; and conduct of small-scale operations.
Some army commando units placed under the operational control of
the Super Governor are employed for larger scale operations and
raids against terrorists. Army and Jandarma special operation
units whose numbers have increased since 1994 are mainly used
against terrorist targets whose location is known as a result of
specific intelligence. Of all units deployed, 25% are employed
in operations, 22% in border control and 10% for the protection
of critical installations.
C. Code of Conduct
Turkish security forces have adopted a code of conduct which
meets international internal conflict and human rights standards,
although in practice these standards are not always met. (SEE
ANNEX II).
According to the Government of Turkey, there is no excuse for
any Turkish officer, NCO or soldier to commit or tolerate any
human rights violation in the southeast. Mistreatment of
prisoners or noncombatants is prohibited. That said, the Turkish
army is a conscript force, often lacking professional small unit
leadership, especially on the field where it is most needed. We
have no information regarding mechanisms to enforce the Code.
V. Activities of Turkish Security Forces in Anti-PKK Operations
As part of their legitimate struggle against PKK terrorism,
Turkish forces regularly engage PKK forces in towns and villages.
Noncombatant casualties occur, but there is no credible evidence
that Turkish forces attack towns indiscriminately or in the
absence of a PKK threat. Village evacuations occur under a
variety of circumstances; but there are indications that many
occur as a result of a broader military strategy to deprive the
PKK of logistical bases in the countryside.
A. Engaging PKK Guerrillas in Towns
Turkish forces move against the PKK in a town or city either
when provoked or when they believe that the PKK has essentially
taken over a populated area and must be routed. For the PKK to
hold sway over the population of a town or city is very damaging
to the image of a government that should be -- and must convince
its citizens that it is -- able to maintain control of its
territory and protect its citizens. Because of the concentration
of civilians and PKK tactics, the probability is high that there
will be civilian casualties.
Two frequently noted and documented examples of Turkish
attacks into southeastern towns occurred in Lice and Sirnak in
1993 and 1992. In the case of Lice (October 1993) the GOT
claimed the PKK started the firefight by killing a brigadier
general. In the case of Sirnak (August 1992) the GOT also
claimed the PKK was the aggressor. In neither case is it clear
what actually happened. In both cases there was apparently a
heavy firefight between Turkish security forces and the PKK that
resulted in casualties, including civilians (in each case the
estimated civilian death toll was around 30), and buildings
damaged or destroyed.
In neither case did the security forces demonstrate
transparency. Neither the press nor parliamentary delegations
were allowed access in the aftermath. As of February 1995,
parliamentary delegations still had a difficult time obtaining
government access to Lice. The GOT has never made public
investigation reports on these incidents. With the PKK having
been pushed out of the urban areas, since 1994 these types of
incidents have no longer occurred in towns and cities.
B. Village Evacuations and Destruction
According to Turkish government figures, as of October 1,
1994, 1,046 villages and hamlets had been evacuated: 75 by the
regional governorship for "security reasons;" 812 because of "PKK
pressure;" and 34 for "economic reasons." Most NGOs now estimate
the total number of evacuated villages and hamlets at around
2,000. Various sources estimated that over two million have left
their homes. Village evacuations have been a significant
contributing factor to this. The majority of evacuations have
taken place over the last two years.
The scale of these evacuations over a relatively short period
of time suggests that in many instances they are part of a GOT
military strategy designed to deprive the PKK of any logistical
base in the countryside. In May 1994, the Minister of Defense
stated that, in order to control PKK activity in the region, 50
settlement centers, containing approximately 10,000 persons
around Mount Ararat and Tenduruk mountain, would be evacuated and
that those regions would be declared a military zone.
While the overall purpose of the evacuations would appear to
be to deny the PKK control of the countryside, the precise
circumstances of individual evacuations are less clear. In some
instances, government security forces appear to have reacted in
response to a specific PKK threat to the villagers. In these
cases, the PKK force villagers to supply them with food, shelter
and intelligence. Security forces then evacuate these villages
as part of their operations to remove the PKK.
Reputable human rights NGOs, after undertaking research and
field interviews, report that most village evacuations result
from actions by Turkish security forces and that forced
displacements usually result from refusal to join the village
guard system or from supporting the PKK, usually for giving food
and a place to sleep, or for suspicion of committing such acts.
The USG cannot confirm these conclusions. Kurdish refugees
interviewed by USG personnel offered similar explanations for
their evacuations.
Whatever the precise circumstances of individual evacuation,
governments are expected to provide for the security and shelter
of their evacuated citizens.
According to Interior Minister Mentese's March 1995 statement
in response to a question in Parliament, the GOT has extended TL 9
billion (approximately USD 225,000) in financial support for
construction of 3,069 houses in compensation to villagers
displaced in the southeast, largely, in his words, as a result
of PKK activity. The Government states that, to the degree
possible, Turkish armed forces provide social support, repairing
schools burned or destroyed by the PKK, maintaining roads, and
providing health services and temporary teacher support.
To date, Government of Turkey programs to deal with the many
internal migrants have been very inadequate. Few displaced
villagers have been compensated, and there seems to be an ad hoc
quality to most compensations. Many migrants are living in
overcrowded quarters with relatives in the larger cities in the
southeast. Apparently as a result of serious overall budgetary
problems, much 1994 aid promised by the government was not
disbursed, and there is no provision for assistance in the 1995
budget. Nor have new governmental entities been created to
render such assistance.
The majority of those evacuated or who left voluntarily have
moved to major cities, where, for the most part, they have moved
in with other families. In Diyarbakir, for instance, the
population has tripled in the past three years due to the
evacuations and conflict in the southeast. Yet city budgets have
not been supplemented by Ankara, partially because cities receive
their allocation based on the most recent census. Therefore,
cities in the southeast such as Diyarbakir are receiving
allocations based on a population which predates the great
immigration of the past three years. There is no relief in sight
unless Parliament passes a new law changing the basis for
allocation. No such law has yet been introduced.
In some instances evacuations of villages have been
accompanied by burning, bombing, shelling or other destruction.
In some cases, the PKK has been responsible for burnings and
evacuations. In other instances, government security forces have
been involved in village burning and destruction. In 1993, press
and human rights organizations began reporting numerous instances
of village destruction. The USG has not definitively confirmed
any of the incidents reported in 1993 but some have been
corroborated by eye witness accounts to U.S. Embassy officials.
Illustrative of these accounts was that related to U.S.
Embassy officials by an evacuee from a village in Siirt province.
According to the evacuee, a mixed group of army and Jandarma came
to their village in the fall of 1993 and asked the men to join
the village guard program. They refused. The soldiers then
gathered the men in front of the village mosque and told them if
they refused to join, the troops would fire. Again they refused.
The security forces held their fire but told the village's 50-60
families they had eight days to pack and leave. While they were
preparing to leave, security forces shelled the village with
artillery or mortars (probably mortars). One night, 25 "rockets"
were fired on the houses. On the day they were leaving the
soldiers killed all their livestock -- horses, cows and sheep.
The interviewee maintained that the village had no relationship
with the PKK.
In March 1994, all major Turkish dailies reported that
Turkish warplanes had bombed a village in Sirnak province in
southeastern Turkey. On March 31, the TDN carried a follow-up
story stating that at least 4 villages were bombed and at least
20 civilians killed. The GOT denies that this raid took place
but USG personnel have determined that raids did take place and
that some civilians were killed. We have been unable to
determine all the circumstances surrounding this incident.
Village burnings and destruction became an issue of lively
public debate within Turkey in September 1994 following a major
security campaign against the PKK in Tunceli province. TGS
officials have stated that no villages or hamlets were evacuated
or intentionally burned by Turkish troops. They assert that in
some instances PKK terrorists in military uniforms raided and set
fire to villages after villagers refused to cooperate with them.
They do acknowledge collateral damage as a result of firefights.
One MP said that villagers with whom he spoke in the
southeast were certain that security forces had set fire to their
villages because the people who set the fires came by helicopters
and only the security forces have helicopters.
The USG has been unable, for reasons of security, to visit
Tunceli province, but we believe that many unanswered questions
remain and have urged the GOT to undertake further investigation.
GOT sensitivity to human rights concerns shown in the recent
military operations in northern Iraq may stem in part from a
heightened awareness caused by the international and domestic
reaction to the Tunceli campaign.
C. Extrajudicial Killings and Disappearances
Extrajudicial killings and so-called "mystery killings"
occurred at a high rate until the end of 1994; subsequently they
have decreased. The total over the past three years now exceeds
2000. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRF) claimed that
government security forces were responsible for 33 extrajudicial
killings in the first 10 months of 1994. Other human rights
organizations have also made credible allegations that security
forces are involved in some of these extrajudicial killings.
These accusations have been given some credence within Turkey
itself. According to Turkish press reports, the April 1995
report of the Turkish parliamentary committee, formed in February
1993 to investigate these murders, concluded that "illegal
formations" within the state bear some responsibility for
"mystery murders" and that these elements must be "cleansed" and
delivered up to justice. The USG finds the conclusions of the
parliamentary committee report, as leaked to the press, credible.
VI. Torture and Intimidation
A. Military-Jandarma Involvement in Torture
The USG is aware of only isolated reports of military or
Jandarma involvement in acts of torture. The majority of torture
cases perpetrated by security forces related to the conflict in
the southeast involve abuse at the hands of the Turkish National
Police, after the Jandarma or military has
handed them over. There were three reports of torture by the
Jandarma in 1993, but we are aware of none since then. The most
troubling 1993 report concerns a Jandarma operation in Ormanici
village in Sirnak province raised at the European Human Rights
Commission. The report alleges that Jandarma burned down the
village, killed a five-year-old child and tortured forty-three
villagers. The villagers claimed they had been raped with
truncheons and bottles, hosed with water and forced to stand
barefoot for hours in freezing temperatures, and beaten on the
bottoms of their feet.
B. The Broader Problem of Torture
There is a constitutional ban on torture in Turkey, as well
as legal bans, and Turkey has acceded to international
conventions banning torture. Law enforcement officials accused
of torturing or mistreating suspects are supposed to be tried
and, if convicted, sentenced to up to five years in prison.
Police and military academies now include mandatory courses on
human rights. Foreign Ministry officials regularly lecture to
police, subgovernors and other officials on the need to maintain
international human rights standards. To date, however, the
practice continues.
As of September 1994, 4,149 applications claiming torture,
maltreatment, or arbitrary detention had been filed with the
Parliamentary Human Rights Commission since its September 1991
inception. In each case, the Commission had written to the
offices of the public prosecutor, the governor's office, and the
security directorate general. There is no indication that these
communications have had any effect or that the Commission has
followed up on these cases. The HRF's torture rehabilitation
centers in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul reported that within the
first 6 months of 1994, they had received a total of 196
applications for treatment.
Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of
torture state that most persons charged with, or suspected of,
political crimes usually suffer some torture during periods of
incommunicado detention in police stations and Jandarma
headquarters before they are brought before a court. The Human
Rights Foundation of Turkey and private attorneys reported that
in 1994 there was no indication of either the amelioration of
treatment of those charged under the Anti-Terror Law or an
overall decrease in the incidence of torture.
A number of aspects of the structure of Turkey's legal system
and laws are conducive to torture. The police "culture" is to
obtain a confession. Cases are easier to resolve once
the suspect has confessed. Hence, law enforcement officials have
come to rely on this method. Law enforcement officers and
attorneys alike are untrained in building evidentiary and
circumstantial cases to avoid the temptation to extract a
confession by torture.
Human rights observers report that the system whereby the
arresting police officer is also responsible for interrogating
the suspect is conducive to torture because the officer seeks to
obtain a confession that would justify the arrest. However,
according to others familiar with Turkish police operations, in
petty criminal cases, the arresting officer is responsible for
following up on the case, whereas in major cases such as murder
and political or terrorism-related crimes, "desks" responsible
for the area in question are responsible for the interrogation.
Another contributing factor, particularly in state security
court cases, is the suspect's lack of early attorney access. The
ability of an attorney to be present during interrogation would
greatly reduce the possibility of torture. Although the
implementation of the revised Criminal Trials Procedure Law
(CMUK) in January 1993 facilitated more immediate attorney
access to those arrested for common crimes, its provisions of
immediate attorney access do not apply to those detained under
the anti-terror law. Furthermore, some attorneys in the
southeast reported that some common criminals are booked on
anti-terror charges, thereby depriving them of access to or by an
attorney. The CMUK's allowable, maximum prearraignment detention
periods still exceed Council of Europe maximums.
Medical examinations are required and should help alleviate
the problem of torture. Although the government asserts that
medical examinations occur once during detention and a second
time before either arraignment or release, former detainees
asserted that some medical examinations took place too long after
the event to reveal any definitive findings. Practice varies
widely: In some cases proper examinations are conducted; in
others, doctors sign papers handed to them; some examinations are
cursory, some are done in the presence of police officials and
some doctors are at times under pressure to submit false or
misleading medical certificates, denying evidence of torture.
The one single factor that is perhaps more responsible than
any other for the continuation of the practice of torture in
Turkey is the lack of timely, serious prosecutions of law
enforcement officers accused of torture. Special provincial
administrative boards, rather than regular courts decide whether
to prosecute in such cases, and suspects' legal fees are paid by
their employing agencies. Under the State of Emergency, any
lawsuit directed at government authorities must be approved by
the regional governor. Under the Administrative
Adjudication Law, an administrative investigation into alleged
torture cases is conducted to determine if there is enough
evidence to bring a law enforcement officer to trial. Under the
Criminal Trials Procedure Law (CMUK), while prosecutors are
empowered to initiate investigations of police officers or
Jandarma suspected of torturing or maltreating suspects, in cases
where township security directors or Jandarma commanders are
accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain permission to
initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice because
these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of
judges.
Credible sources in the human rights and legal communities
estimate that judicial authorities investigate only about
one-half of the formal complaints involving torture and prosecute
only a small fraction of those. Under the Anti-Terror Law,
officials accused of torture or other mistreatment may continue
to work while under investigation and, if convicted, may only be
suspended.
According to the government, in the first 9 months of 1994,
prosecutors considered 963 complaints of torture or maltreatment.
Of those, 314 cases were opened, 355 were in preparation, 187
were dropped, in 25 cases the court decided it did not have the
authority to pursue the case, and in 47 cases the court referred
the case to another court. There were 11 convictions and 22
acquittals. In one case the complaint was withdrawn. Most of
these cases were in Istanbul and Ankara; few were in the
southeast.
In the few instances in which law enforcement officers are
convicted of torture, sentences tend to be light. In July 1994,
Ekrem Guner, a noncommissioned officer, was convicted of
torturing two persons in Ordu in 1989, sentenced to 2 years in
prison, suspended from duty for 5 months and 15 days, and fined
TL 375,000 (roughly dollars 12). In July 1994, the Ankara
administrative court ordered the interior ministry to pay Mediha
Curabaz TL 10 million (roughly dollars 300) in compensation for
torture she sustained in August 1991 by the Adana police. The
Adana Provincial Administrative Commission had refused to try the
police officers involved on charges of rape and torture, despite a
medical report which confirmed the charge of rape. In April
1994, the torture conviction of two officers and two
noncommissioned officers in the 1985 torture and death of
schoolteacher Siddik Bilgin was overturned on appeal, and the
officers were acquitted on retrial.
As Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court
of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights,
Turkish citizens may file applications alleging violations of
the European Convention on Human Rights with the Commission.
Some 250 cases are currently before the Commission. To date, the
Government of Turkey has paid out the equivalent of $500,000 in
compensation for decisions received in the court.
VII. Use of U.S.-Origin Equipment
U.S.-origin weapons systems deployed by the Turkish military
include:
-- F-16 fighter aircraft;
-- Cobra/Super Cobra attack helicopters;
-- Blackhawk transport helicopters; and
-- tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems
and most of the ordinance for the above systems.
According to the TGS, all weapons and ammunition from either
U.S. or Turkish source are used as follows:
-- in a controlled manner for the purpose of minimizing the
casualties of security forces and encouraging terrorists to
surrender;
-- general purpose helicopters are used for reconnaissance,
observation, supply, evacuation, and command and control of
operations;
-- armed helicopters are used against terrorist groups who
refuse to surrender, to combat PKK raids on military posts
and to protect villages and military convoys;
-- tanks and APCs are used for deterrence, shows of force,
the protection of critical installations and base security;
-- aircraft are used for shows of force, reconnaissance, and
against cross-border targets on a limited scale.
According to the TGS, the majority of the weapons used by the
Jandarma are of national origin; those of U.S. origin are very
limited. The police are equipped with weapons of U.S.-origin, as
well as weapons from Italy, France and Germany. In addition,
most of the army units deployed in the region are equipped with
U.S. weapons and equipment.
Many eye witness reports of village evacuations refer to the
use of major military equipment such as armored personnel
carriers, helicopters, and trucks. In a number of instances
reported by U.S. human rights NGOs and others, eye witnesses have
identified the equipment involved as U.S. models.
-- Evacuated villagers from Nurettin identified M-113 armored
personnel carriers as being involved in the evacuation of
that village in November 1993.
-- Both Blackhawk and Super Cobra helicopters were identified
in press reports as having been used in operations in Tunceli
province in September-October 1994.
-- As indicated earlier, reportedly at least 4 F-16's bombed
four villages on March 26, 1994.
The USG finds the evidence for the use of this equipment in these
three instances highly credible.
We do not have information regarding the extent to which U.S.
equipment has been involved in village evacuations and/or
destruction more generally. Since most, but not all of Turkey's
major military equipment has been supplied by the U.S., it is
highly likely that U.S. equipment and ordinance has been involved
in such operations.
The USG has no reliable information on the origin of the
weapons involved in "mystery killings" and disappearances. There
are some eyewitness accounts of abduction by helicopter, but the
U.S. has been unable to confirm them.
There is no direct evidence of the use of equipment of US
origin in torture. Reports of beatings of villagers by rifle
butts cannot be assumed to have involved the use of U.S.-origin
rifles because the G-3 rifle, which is most commonly used by
Jandarma forces, is not a U.S. product and is manufactured in
country. The use of U.S.-origin trucks, APC's and helicopters is
ubiquitous. It can be assumed that they would be used to
transport any security forces perpetrating such acts.
VIII. Steps Being Taken by the GOT to Improve the Human Rights
Situation
Recently the Government of Turkey has taken a number of steps to
improve its human rights situation.
A. Human Rights Training
Pursuant to regulations issued in December 1994, a new
program began in January 1995 which will train 160 Turkish armed
forces officers in human rights. In addition, starting in March
1995, the following human rights training began:
-- a 2-hour training block for generals and admirals;
-- 4 hours of instruction on human rights for those participating
in special courses related to internal security operations;
-- 3 hours of instruction in infantry, armor, artillery and
engineering schools as well as in Jandarma officer and NCO
schools;
-- 2-hour training blocks for army school and army academy
students and for those in the Turkish armed forces academy;
-- 4 hours of practical instruction for officers, NCOs, corporals
and privates assigned to internal security operations.
Those personnel will be instructed in:
-- an introduction to, and the history of, the concept of human
rights;
-- the importance of human rights in today's world and the basic
rights guaranteed under various human rights agreements; the
responsibilities set forth in international agreements to which
Turkey is a signatory;
-- the necessary measures to be taken in order not to be found in
violation of human rights and how to distinguish more clearly
between guilty and innocent persons when soldiers are assigned to
duty during war or to an arm of the armed forces in an internal
security operation during extraordinary circumstances as defined
by the constitution; and
-- the responsibility of someone found in violation of human
rights and the legal action that will be taken against soldiers
found in such violation.
B. Anti-Torture Measures
Government officials have also taken a number of steps to
address directly the use of torture. In the first three months
of 1995, until he was replaced in a cabinet reshuffle, State
Minister-in-Charge of Human Rights Koyluoglu was outspoken
against torture. The first GOT official to speak so openly about
the issue, he vowed to put an end to torture in Turkey. He
intervened in several cases to urge that law enforcement
officials charged with torture be brought to court.
Since January 1994, according to a Prime Ministerial
circular, all Jandarma and police stations have had to provide
monthly reports on the number of torture complaints and attorneys
provided to suspects. In February 1995, the Interior Ministry,
under instructions of the Prime Minister, distributed a
follow-up, more detailed circular to all police stations.
Specifically, the directive requires that:
-- police observe all legal practices and permissible periods
of detention;
-- no detainee be mistreated, no matter what the crime;
European and American methods will be used to obtain
information from the detainee;
-- a medical examination be carried out as required by a
previous health ministry circular;
-- detainees' meetings with their attorneys be carried out in
accordance with the law;
-- police stations be inspected for torture instruments and
that such instruments (if any are found) be removed;
-- all detainees be registered;
-- detainees' cells be sufficiently large and sanitary;
-- legal action be taken immediately against any policeman or
other law enforcement officer who engages in maltreatment of
detainees;
-- to ensure full implementation of the directive, that
police stations under the control of the governor and head of
the security directorate be inspected continually and that
the results of such inspections be sent to the Ministry of
the Interior.
C. Freedom of Expression and Democracy
Issues of freedom of expression have also high on the public
agenda recently. That high-profile journalists and writers have
been imprisoned or are on trial for disseminating separatist
propaganda has pushed this issue into the public spotlight. The
village evacuation controversy has also engendered lively debate.
The current State Minister for Human Rights is focusing on the
southeast and how best to begin to heal the wounds there.
The best chance for significant progress on democratization
will come in the next weeks as the government seeks a majority in
Parliament to pass the legislative agenda necessary for the
European Parliament to approve Turkey's customs union agreement
with the EU.
Prime Minister Ciller's March 14 human rights policy speech
at Bilkent University was the first effort in that direction, and
she has publicly committed herself to push for democratization
legislation. If all the proposed measures are implemented, they
would significantly broaden political participation and expand
freedom of expression. They would allow the PM to phase out the
State of Emergency in effect since 1987 in ten southeastern
provinces.
In her March 14 speech, Ciller stated her democratization
goals as follows:
-- Removal of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which makes
dissemination of separatist propaganda a terrorist crime and uses
an overly broad definition of "terrorism." This would lift a key
restriction on freedom of expression, allow for the release of
some 150 imprisoned intellectuals, and end close to 2000 ongoing
court cases.
-- Passage of a package of constitutional amendments that would
remove impediments in the military-drafted 1982 Constitution to
broader political participation. Passage requires a
supermajority in a secret ballot of 300 out of 428 potential
votes (22 seats are vacant); 270-300 votes in favor would force a
divisive and unpredictable referendum.
-- Phasing out the State of Emergency, contingent on passage of
new provincial administration reform legislation.
-- Protecting citizens against torture and abuse, and including
human rights courses in the educational system.
Ciller described the challenge as striking a balance between
the rights of the individual and the duties of the state. The
GOT can expect to run into stiff opposition from conservatives,
including those in the Prime Minister's own party, on these
proposed reforms.
The expansion of democracy is important for Turkey and for
all Turkish citizens, just as it is for citizens of all
democracies. In the end, democratic freedoms will be enlarged
because Turks demand it, not because the West criticizes Turkey's
shortcomings. It is for this reason that the U.S. will continue
to lend its full support to Turkish democracy.
IX. Conclusions
1. Turkey continues to be of great strategic importance to the
United States. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has
replaced Germany as the frontline European state. It confronts
the most serious array of challenges and threats to its integrity
and well-being of any Western ally: conflict in the Balkans
threatens stability in the eastern Mediterranean; instability in
the Caucasus and Russia raises historical fears of aggression
from that quarter; and states to the south and southeast actively
support terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism inside Turkey.
Internally, the Turkish government is trying to cope with
tremendous economic adjustments and to improve its democratic
political system to permit more active participation by a broader
segment of the population. The GOT approach to the Kurdish issue
has detracted from its ability to deal with these problems.
Turkey's stability and well-being are critical to stability
in the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and ultimately Central
Europe. Its continued Western orientation is essential to U.S.
policy goals in the Middle East and Central Asia. Continuing
United States support for Turkey's security, both external and
internal, is essential.
2. The PKK presents a major threat to Turkey's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a
ruthless terrorist group, which receives substantial support not
only from Syria, Iran, and some sources in Europe, has exploited
the internal and external challenges facing Turkey. It has
terrorized the population of southeast Turkey, destabilized the
region, and threatened the country's territorial integrity.
3. In combatting the PKK, the GOT approach has been largely
military. Alone, that cannot succeed. Turkey needs to combine
this with a civil approach to the problem in the southeast. The
Turkish government appears to be pursuing a broad military
strategy to control the area which has entailed the evacuation
and/or destruction of many villages. Although the government has
issued a code of conduct designed to prevent most human rights
abuses, violations by Turkish security forces have nevertheless
occurred in the course of operations. In addition, the GOT has
an internationally recognized obligation to provide for those who
are displaced. Until now it has not sufficiently addressed this
obligation.
4. Turkey, as the recipient of U.S. security assistance, has the
right to use U.S. supplied weapons for legitimate self-defense
and for internal security. This includes use to combat terrorism
by forces such as the PKK.
U.S.-origin equipment, which accounts for most major items of
the Turkish military inventory, has been used in operations
against the PKK, during which human rights abuses have occurred.
It is highly likely that such equipment was used in support of
the evacuation and/or destruction of villages. However, we have
no evidence that verifies reports of torture and extrajudicial
killings involving U.S. equipment.
5. The Government of Turkey has acknowledged the need to improve
its human rights practices and has made proposals, which, if
adopted and implemented, could lead to important positive changes
in the situation in the southeast. The Turkish government has
recognized the need for improvement in both military and
political spheres. On the military side, the December 1994
initiation of a program of human rights training for officers,
the new willingness to make public the Code of Conduct
promulgated by the Turkish General Staff, and the principal
guidelines for the operation in northern Iraq are examples.
Turkey's apparently serious effort to protect civilians from
harm during the operation in northern Iraq, and to limit the
scope and duration of that operation, is also an important
example of progress, although more access for neutral observers
would have been desirable.
On the political side, Prime Minister Ciller has tabled a
series of democratization/human rights proposals in the
parliament, and is pushing for passage this summer. These
proposals include an orderly phase out of the State of Emergency
in the southeast; a package of constitutional amendments to
broaden participation in the political process; amendments to the
Anti-Terror law to increase freedom of expression; possible
amnesty for those convicted for things they have said or written;
additional protections against torture; and increased attention
to human rights in Turkey's educational system. Passage of these
proposals is critical to improvement of the human rights
situation in Turkey, and key to Turkey's acceptance into
additional European institutions, both of which are high priority
U.S. foreign policy objectives.
PM Ciller has taken steps to reduce the incidence of torture
by security forces with the initiation of a required monthly
complaints system and by disseminating to all police stations a
detailed circular forbidding torture.
6. The Administration believes that increased structural ties
with the West and progress on democratization in Turkey will be
mutually reinforcing and is actively supporting both. In this
regard, completion of the customs union between Turkey and the
European Union would give an important impetus to efforts to
promote democracy and human rights.
7. Democracy and human rights are and will continue to be an
integral part of the ongoing U.S.-Turkish high-level dialogue.
The democratization measures recently introduced into Parliament
and the new TGS regulations are indications of the efficacy of
reasoned discussion with the Turks on the issue of human rights.
We can and should expect progress.
PART II. CYPRUS
With the historic decisions of the European Union on
March 6, conclusion of the Turkish Cypriot election campaign, and
reaffirmation by Prime Minister Ciller of Turkey's determination
to work toward a solution to the Cyprus problem, the time is
favorable to achieving progress on the overall solution, as well
as early implementation of the UN-proposed package of
confidence-building measures (CBMs). United States diplomacy
works toward that end, in full support of the good offices
mission of the UN Secretary General and his team.
TURKISH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR UN EFFORTS ON CYPRUS
The Government of Turkey has, over the years, stressed its
support for the UN efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Since
the beginning of 1994, the Government of Turkey has been
particularly supportive of the UN proposed package of
confidence-building measures. Subsequent to acceptance of the
CBM's by the Greek Cypriots in March 1994, Ankara strongly
encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to accept the CBMs. Finally,
after meetings between the senior Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot
leadership on June 16, Mr. Denktash announced his willingness to
immediately implement the package. Unfortunately, by that time,
Greek-Cypriot support for the measures had eroded. Since that
time, the Government of Turkey's support for the CBMs has
remained firm. Prime Minister Ciller personally assured
President Clinton on April 19 that Ankara and the Turkish
Cypriots were willing to immediately implement the UN package.
Turkey has also actively supported the Turkish Cypriot
announcement in January 1995 of several unilateral measures to
increase contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SINCE AUGUST 1994
In August, U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Richard Boucher met with
Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. Mr. Denktash told
Ambassador Boucher that he would be willing to meet with
Greek-Cypriot leader Clerides and that he was willing to
implement the UN-proposed package of confidence building measures
immediately. Ambassador Boucher also met with Greek-Cypriot
leader Clerides in August, who stressed that paragraph two of
UNSCR 939 was a minimal step which the Turkish side needed to
accept. He added that on this basis the possibility of agreement
on the CBMs and other measures could be increased. Ambassador
Boucher urged that both sides avoid setting preconditions, and
reiterated that the two leaders consider direct talks as part of a
preliminary process to explore common ground and avoid an early
impasse.
Secretary Christopher wrote to UN Secretary General Boutros
Ghali on September 14 and responded to the Secretary General's
request to the Perm Five for recommendations on how best to
proceed on Cyprus. The Secretary stated firmly that the U.S. is
committed to promoting a solution to the division of Cyprus. He
noted that both parties had accepted the UN-sponsored package of
confidence-building measures, although differences remained on
the modalities of implementation. The Secretary further stated
that implementation of the CBMs should proceed and reiterated a
desire to move forward on discussions of an overall solution.
UN Special Cyprus Negotiator Joe Clark travelled to Cyprus on
September 14 and met separately with Mr. Clerides and Mr.
Denktash. Mr. Clark expressed concern that the Cyprus talks were
moving toward impasse and asked both sides to work within the
framework of UN Security Council Resolution 939. He stated that,
although progress toward an overall solution is the goal, it was
important to take advantage of the progress already achieved and
go forward with the CBMs.
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter
Tarnoff met separately with Turkish Prime Minister Ciller and
Foreign Minister Soysal on September 15 in Ankara. Both assured
Mr. Tarnoff of Turkey's commitment to a negotiated settlement on
Cyprus, and they both also expressed Turkey's full support for
the immediate implementation of the CBMs.
Mr. Clark travelled to Ankara in September where he met with
Turkish Foreign Minister Soysal and Deputy Undersecretary Tugay
Ulucevik September 19-20. The Foreign Minister and Ambassador
Ulucevik pledged continued Turkish support for and cooperation
with the good offices mission of the UN Secretary General. They
stressed the need for implementation of the CBMs and a fair
proposal for an overall solution.
U.S. Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff met with Cyprus
Foreign Minister Michaelides on September 26 in New York. Mr.
Tarnoff reiterated the U.S. belief that the CBMs are
indispensable to overall progress. He also stated that the U.S.
strongly urged both parties to have direct negotiations without
preconditions. Foreign Minister Michaelides stressed the
Greek-Cypriot community's insistence that the Turkish Cypriots
accept paragraph two of UN Security council resolution 939 before
it would agree to direct negotiations.
On October 11, UN Special Negotiator Joe Clark reiterated to
the Security Council that the UN-proposed package of
confidence-building measures (CBMs) should be implemented and
that there should be a continued effort to reach a fair and just
solution on Cyprus. U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Richard Boucher
met on the same day in New York with representatives of Greece,
Turkey, Cyprus and the UN to discuss ways to advance the process.
These efforts led to UN sponsored direct talks between
Greek-Cypriot leader Clerides and Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash
in Nicosia in late October 1994. No concrete agreements were
reached, but all the main issues involved in a settlement were
addressed. Mr. Clerides stated his willingness to continue
discussion if a substantive basis for negotiations was established
within the framework of UN resolutions and the high level
agreements of 1977 and 1979.
The State Department's Special Cyprus Coordinator (SCC),
James Williams, traveled to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey on October
29-November 5. In Nicosia, SCC Williams explored in depth the
views of the two leaders. He urged them to look for common ground
to move the intercommunal process forward, in its overall
substance as well as by early implementation of the CBMs. Mr.
Clerides underscored his belief that early Cypriot membership in
the European Union (EU) would provide benefits and guarantee the
security of both communities. In Athens and in Ankara, Mr.
Williams discussed Cyprus with Foreign Ministry officials and
other government leaders.
On November 8, Greek-Cypriot leader Clerides wrote to
Secretary General Boutros Ghali, stating that further discussion
of the UN-proposed CBMs would be "meaningless" because, in his
view, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership insisted on
rejecting the substance of a federal solution as defined by the
United Nations resolutions. On November 9 and subsequently,
Ambassador Boucher met with Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash to
explore whether he could advance substantive positions within the
framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation, which could lead to
a successful negotiation.
The Turkish Cypriots took a positive step on November 21,
1994, when Mr. Denktash wrote to UN Secretary General Boutros
Ghali reaffirming his commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal
federation. He also stated his willingness to enter into
immediate negotiations with Mr. Clerides and stated his agreement
to discuss eventual Cyprus membership in the European Union in the
context of the UN proposed "Set of Ideas." The two leaders
expressed their desire to reach a settlement. In addition, Mr.
Denktash reiterated his commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal
federation with a single sovereignty and single citizenship.
On January 5, President Clinton announced the appointment of
Mr. Richard Beattie as the Special Presidential Emissary for
Cyprus, in order to raise the level of representation and
commitment by the United States to promoting a solution.
Also on January 5, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, accompanied by Special Cyprus Coordinator James
Williams, and the Director of the Office of Southern European
Affairs, Marshall Adair, travelled to Nicosia where he strongly
conveyed to the Cypriot parties the U.S. desire to help reach a
Cyprus settlement. Mr. Holbrooke had lengthy meetings with
President Clerides and other officials of the Republic of Cyprus.
He also met with Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash and authorities
of the Turkish-Cypriot administration. Both sides expressed a
commitment to see the Cyprus problem resolved but described
fundamentally different ways of addressing the issues of
negotiations. Mr. Clerides advocated a comprehensive approach,
whereas Mr. Denktash supported a step-by-step discussion beginning
with the CBMs. Referring to the application by the Republic of
Cyprus to join the European Union, Mr. Holbrooke expressed the
hope that Cyprus would enter the Union as a federation in which
all Cypriots could share the benefits of membership.
Subsequent to his trip Assistant Secretary Holbrooke undertook
an intensive diplomatic effort in Europe to encourage progress by
the EU on two related goals: agreement to begin EU accession
talks for Cyprus, and completion of an EU customs union agreement
with Turkey. This effort was designed to promote the Cyprus talks
by enhancing the attractiveness of a federal solution on Cyprus
and improving general stability in the region.
On January 18, U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Richard Boucher met
with Mr. Denktash. The Turkish-Cypriot leader used the
opportunity to emphasize his support for certain elements of the
1992 UN Set of Ideas. On January 20, Mr. Denktash issued a letter
which was circulated as a UN Document, in which he reaffirmed the
Turkish side's commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal federation and
called for immediate implementation of the CBMs. He also
announced a number of unilateral humanitarian steps intended to
assist the Maronite and Greek-Cypriot communities living in
northern Cyprus. On January 21, Mr. Clerides replied to Mr.
Denktash's initiative in a press release, which has also been
circulated as a UN document. He asserted that talks on the CBMs
would be useless without progress on the basic aspects of the
Cyprus problem.
Mr. Beattie and SCC Williams visited Nicosia January 25
through January 29. They met twice each with Mr. Clerides and Mr.
Denktash. They used these meetings to explore the positions and
flexibility of the two sides on key issues. Mr. Beattie urged
both leaders to improve the atmosphere between the communities and
suggested that each consider concrete steps which would reduce
military tensions along the Green Line and Buffer Zone. They also
encouraged the possibility of unilateral humanitarian gestures.
In addition to the two leaders, the U.S. delegation met with other
Greek and Turkish Cypriot community representatives.
Special Cyprus Coordinator James Williams traveled to New York
City on February 13 where he called separately on Cypriot
Permanent Representative Shambos, Turkish Permanent Representative
Batu, and Turkish-Cypriot Representative Ertug. SCC Williams
briefed them on Presidential Emissary Beattie's and his January
trip to the region. They also discussed how UN activity in New
York could complement the Secretary General's good offices
mission. SCC Williams stressed to Shambos and Ertug the need for
both sides to take unilateral steps to improve the humanitarian
situation in Cyprus.
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, accompanied by Director of
Southern European Affairs, Marshall Adair, traveled to Ankara
February 20-22. While in Ankara, Mr. Holbrooke had extensive
meetings with the Turkish leadership and impressed upon them the
importance the U.S. places in finding a just solution to the
Cyprus problem. Prime Minister Ciller assured Mr. Holbrooke that
her government is serious in its resolve to achieve an overall
solution. She promised to work closely with the Turkish Cypriots
to achieve a settlement to this long standing problem.
On March 6, the Ministerial Council of the European Union
approved a customs union with Turkey, and agreed to begin
negotiations with Cyprus on its application for membership within
six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental
Conference which begins in 1996.
UN Special Representative for Cyprus Joe Clark visited Cyprus
on March 8 and 9. He met with both sides in an effort to find
common ground to restart face-to-face negotiations. Mr. Clark
used the opportunity of his visit to explain to the
Turkish-Cypriot side the economic and social benefits which it
would receive with the accession of the entire island to the
European Union. He urged Turkish-Cypriot leaders to support EU
accession for Cyprus and to discuss Turkish-Cypriot questions with
the Greek Cypriots and the EU Observer for Cyprus.
Presidential Emissary Beattie and SCC Williams visited Turkey
March 5-9. On his first official trip to Turkey,
Mr. Beattie met with Prime Minister Ciller, Foreign Minister
Karayalcin and other Turkish leaders. He discussed with them the
need for a bizonal, bicommunal federation in Cyprus formed by the
two communities. He also reiterated U.S. support for the eventual
accession of a Cyprus federation, which includes both of the
island's communities, to the European Union. The Turkish leaders
assured Mr. Beattie of their support for a bizonal, bicommunal
federation and desire to see implemented the UN-proposed package
of confidence-building measures.
On March 13 UN Special Representative Clark visited Ankara
where he met with Foreign Minister Karayalcin. The Foreign
Minister told Mr. Clark that the Turkish Government was fully
supportive of the good offices mission of the Secretary General.
Ankara also assigned priority to the early implementation of the
UN-proposed package of confidence-building measures as a first
step towards a comprehensive solution.
On April 19, Turkish Prime Minister Ciller met with President
Clinton in Washington. She stated that Turkey wants a solution of
the Cyprus problem. She pledged Turkey's firm support for
negotiations on an overall solution and reiterated Ankara's desire
to see the CBMs immediately implemented. On April 22, Mr.
Denktash was reelected as leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
All candidates in that election called for a change in the status
quo and a negotiated settlement. Mr. Denktash's campaign slogan
was "1996: Year of Solution." SCC Williams and Ambassador Boucher
met with him on April 30. Denktash said that the Turkish-Cypriot
side is prepared to negotiate seriously on an overall solution,
and again reiterated his willingness to immediately implement the
CBMs.
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
Annex I
Turkish General Staff Responses to Specific Allegations
On February 24, the U.S. Mission provided the GOT a list of
specific allegations of human rights abuse by Turkish security
forces. The TGS undertook to investigate each allegation and
report the results to the Embassy. The results of those
investigations follow:
1. Allegation: As a result of explosives dropped from
helicopters on Tunceli/Ovacik/Cet settlement on 17 September 1993,
2 civilians died and 7 were wounded.
Result of investigation: A Jandarma post in Yesilyazi village
was attacked on 16 September 1993 at 1600 hours by a group of
terrorist reinforcements directed to the area. The clash ended
with 3 security force members (including one army captain) killed,
3 wounded, and 4 armed terrorists captured. Following that, 6 a/c
sorties and armed helicopters were employed during subsequent
operations but under strict FAC control. No damage to, or
casualties in, the civilian population were reported and there
were no known incidents of that type.
2. Allegation: On 3 November 1993, in Mus/Eralan village, 4
civilians were killed in custody.
Result of Investigation: The bodies of Yakup Tetik, Mehmet
Emin Bingol, Mahmut Acar and Alican Ener were found in the
countryside based on information provided by the locals. Beside
the corpses a note was found "accusing the murdered individuals of
cooperation with the security forces." This incident has no
relation with the security forces.
3. Allegation: On 8 November 1993, soldiers partly burned
the village of Citlibahce in Diyarbakir/Hazro. Two villagers, who
had served their military service, were able to tell from
photographs that M-113 APCs were used in the operations.
Result: The alleged operation was conducted by 4 Jandarma
commando teams of the Hazro command and 2 village guard teams. No
M-113 was involved and there was none in the Jandarma inventory.
4. Allegation: On 27 November 1993, in Mus/Malazgirt,
Nurettin village was evacuated by force and 20 houses were burned.
Result: This village was not evacuated by security forces; it
was burned by the PKK.
5. Allegation: Turkish television has reported that
during the air raid on the PKK's Zeli camp in northern Iraq
in January 1994, CBU bombs were used.
Result: An air raid was conducted against 500-600 PKK
terrorists on 28 January 1994, by 8 F-4 sorties. 32 CBU-58
bombs were used during this raid. Civilians were not
targeted and were not hit.
6. Allegation: 4 villages were bombed in Sirnak on
4 March 1994, by the Turkish Air Force.
Result: No aid raids were conducted on that day in the
Sirnak area.
7. Allegation: On 26 March 1994, when Kumcati village
was bombed by the Turkish Air Force, 8 civilians, including 3
children, were killed. Hasan Bayir, 6 years old, escaped
and received medical attention. Government officials said
that this was an accident. Despite that, 3 more Kurdish
settlements were bombed on the same day. Inhabitants of all
these villages had refused to join the village guards;
allegedly that was the reason for the bombing.
Result: Kumcati village was bombed neither on that day
nor on any other.
8. Allegation: On 22 April 1994, Serif Avsar was taken
into custody by 5 village guards and 2 men who were believed
to be from the Jandarma intelligence organization, and
disappeared. He was later found dead near Toprakli village
in the Silvan area of Diyarbakir province.
Result: An investigation of the incident revealed that
Serif Avsar was kidnapped by Fevzi Gokcen, Yasar Gunbati,
Omer Gungor, Aziz Ergey, Zeyyat Akcil and Mesut Memeoglu on
22 April 1994, at 1130 hours as the result of an old blood
feud. Later he was found murdered 19 km from the
Diyarbakir/Silvan road. The accused persons have been taken
into custody and the case is currently in court.
9. Allegation: On 8-9 July 1994, villagers of
Yayladere, near Bingol/Genc, alleged that they were beaten
by soldiers from the Bolu commando brigade before their
houses were set on fire; a helicopter arrived and filmed the
incident.
Result: The 2nd command brigade, stationed in Bolu,
conducted very successful operations in the area in July
1994, and the PKK suffered substantial losses. Therefore,
this incident has been fabricated in order to damage the
image of this successful unit and to halt its operations.
10. Allegation: On 18 August 1994, a village leader
named Mehmet Gurkan in Akcayurt village near Diyarbakir told
the press that security forces were responsible for burned
villages and that he was subjected to torture while in
custody. He then disappeared and was never seen again.
Result: Because of large scale terrorist activities in
the region, the inhabitants of Akcayurt left their village
and migrated to the Adana and Mersin areas. Mehmet Gurkan
also moved to Mersin; his address is not known. Mehmet
Gurkan was never taken into custody.
11. Allegation: On 25 September 1994, in
Tunceli/Gokcebag village, as a result of Turkish Air Force
raids, 8 villagers were lost. The bodies of 7 of them were
found later in the bed of Kutu Dere.
Result: No air operations were conducted near Gokcebag
village on that day.
12. Allegation: In early October, in Tunceli, 20
villages were set on fire by the security forces. This
information appeared in the daily Hurriyet. Tunceli/Ovacik
mayor Musa Yerliklaya (SHP) said that 15 villages had been
set on fire by security forces but denied that these forces
were fired on from houses. 35 villages and smaller
settlements were also evacuated by force by security forces.
Result: A large-scale operation began in the Tunceli
area on 29 September 1994, with the purpose of sweeping the
area clear of terrorists and establishing law and order. No
villages were set on fire or evacuated by force by the
security forces. The aforementioned villages were
deliberately burned completely or partially by the PKK with
the aim of creating anti-government feeling among the local
people. These allegations are all propaganda themes.
Annex II-B
Turkish Armed Forces Principal Guidelines for
"Operation Steel" in Northern Iraq
1. No harm will be done to civilians.
2. Open, direct and good relations will be maintained with
the UN agencies operating in Northern Iraq.
3. Open, direct and good relations will be maintained with
the NGOs operating in Northern Iraq.
4. Humanitarian relief efforts to Northern Iraq will be
carried out without disruption. In this respect, the Habur
Gate will remain open.
5. Provide Comfort flights will not be hampered.
6. Turkey's existing dialogue with Barzani, Talabani and
the countries of the region, including Iraq, will be carried
on.
7. Our citizens who were forced by the PKK to migrate from
Turkey to Northern Iraq will by no means be forced to
return.
The wish of those who desire to come back to Turkey will be
documented in cooperation with the UNHCR (although such is
not within the jurisdiction of this agency) and their safe
return will be ensured.
-- In this context, Turkish units are instructed on a
daily basis to continue to safeguard the well-being and
security of the civilian population in the region.
-- In order to ensure the uninterrupted transportation
and the orderly conduct of humanitarian assistance, the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a
liaison office in Zakho. This office is headed by a
senior diplomat.
-- Turkish military field hospitals are providing
continuous health services to the civilian population.
-- Last year, Turkey provided Northern Iraq with a
humanitarian aid package of 13.5 million dollars. This
year's approved Turkish aid program for the region
amounts to 12 million dollars. This includes providing
electric power to the Dohuk region. The power will be
available soon.
-- Our operation is one of a limited scope and duration.
As soon as we achieve our aim of eliminating PKK bases
and facilities in the region, we will withdraw our
troops.
Needless to say, we should take appropriate measures
which will prevent the PKK from reestablishing itself in
Northern Iraq and infiltrating Turkey from there after
our withdrawal.
-- This operation is in no way a substitute for the
measures we intend to take in Turkey in the field of
further democratization.
Annex II-A
Turkish General Staff Code of Conduct
The Turkish General Staff has provided us with its code of
conduct for military operation in the southeast:
-- Security forces are to enter only villages where there is
sufficient information to suggest that terrorists will be
found;
-- Security forces will refrain from damaging private and
public property;
-- Security forces may only use force when they receive
hostile fire; if it comes from a building, weapons may only
be directed at the source of the hostile fire;
-- Every event is to be immediately and accurately reported
to higher authorities;
-- The force commander is to get a signed letter from the
village leaders with a statement that no damage was done or
the extent of any damage caused;
-- Aircraft are not to be used within four kilometers of a
village and are always to be under the control of a
qualified forward air controller.
The security forces' broader objectives, and strategy and
tactics for achieving their objectives, are:
-- To render the PKK ineffective;
-- While staying within the limits of the rule of law, to
respect human rights and not to cause any harm to local
people;
-- To protect the people; and
-- To regain the support of individuals who have supported
the PKK.
To this end, they aim to:
-- Prevent illegal border crossings;
-- Conduct operations against terrorist bases within the
country;
-- Keep the roads and railroads open to ensure freedom of
travel;
-- Meet the social requirements of the local people, such as
education and health services;
-- Create the necessary conditions so that people can lead a
normal daily life;
-- Protect innocent people who are not supportive of the PKK
and regain through peaceful means citizens who passively
support the PKK;
-- Detect and destroy terrorist groups; and
-- Establish the rule of law.
ANNEX III
Village Evacuations
I. Representative First-Hand Stories
In March 1995, a number of displaced villagers told their stories
to U.S. officials. The majority of interviewees claimed that
security forces had asked the villagers to join the village guard
program and then forced them to leave their homes when they
refused to do so. Personal backgrounds of the interviewees are
unknown.
The villagers interviewed appeared to be simple, honest people
who wanted to be left alone. When the villagers declined to
defend themselves, however, the security forces probably viewed
them as unpatriotic/PKK sympathizers.
The following are representative but unconfirmed stories:
Interview 1: A village in Mardin Province: In Summer 1994, the
local Jandarma company commander asked that one member from each
of the village's 200 families join the village guard program.
The villagers did not want to join because village guards were
being killed (by the PKK). After the villagers refused to join,
they were given three days to move. As the villagers left, the
soldiers sprayed a flammable liquid on the houses and set them on
fire. All houses burned. The villagers left their
just-harvested crops in the field. As they moved out, some
villagers were beaten with sticks to get them to move faster.
The villagers dispersed to Adana, Izmir and Istanbul.
Interview 2: A village in Diyarbakir province: In Summer 1994,
Jandarma soldiers in armored personnel carriers and Jandarma
special teams came to the village and asked if the village was
willing to provide village guards. There were 50 families in the
village. After the village declined the offer, the villagers
were ordered to evacuate. When they tried to harvest their
crops, soldiers fired over their heads and everyone hit the
ground to avoid being shot. Thereafter, they moved out. As they
were leaving, village guards from other villages came in and tore
down the doors and window frames; everything that could be burned
as fuel. The villagers had no idea who, if anyone, harvested
their crops and vineyards. The surrounding woods were cut down
for fuel. The villagers were not mistreated as they evacuated.
At the last moment, the village leadership asked if the villagers
could return to the village; they were told they could not.
Interview 3: A village in Siirt province: The interviewee said
that the villagers had refused to become village guards and that,
from 1987 until 1993 they were continually oppressed by the
security forces. The local Jandarma battalion commander told
them that in the end he would win if they did not join the
village guard program. The interviewee claimed he was an orchard
owner and did not want to leave. The security forces started to
harass the village women and girls, but the villagers remained.
Then, in Fall 1993 the security forces started firing mortars
into the village. The villagers told the commander that they
could not leave for financial reasons. The commander threatened
to set fire to the trees and threatened the interviewee
personally. Finally, the interviewee said, the villagers were
told they had four days to accept the proposal to become village
guards or the Jandarma would destroy the village. They realized
they would have to leave because they thought they had no right
to cause the children to suffer. While the villagers were still
in the village, soldiers came and took the window frames and
doors from the houses to burn for fuel. The Jandarma commander
later made good on his threat to burn down the trees. "They
burned them down this past summer. All my property and my
village is gone."
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