THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release May 4, 1995
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM PERRY,
AND SECRETARY OF TREASURY ROBERT RUBIN
The Briefing Room
2:25 P.M. EDT
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: As you all know, President Clinton
will participate next week in an important series of events to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of V-E Day, as well as to meet with the
Presidents of Ukraine and Russia. In Moscow and Kiev, the President will
honor the immense wartime sacrifice of the people of Europe, especially
those in the East -- in Russia and Ukraine and Belarus and Poland -- on
whose territory the bloodiest fighting took place.
It also will be an opportunity for the President to recall
the wartime alliance with Moscow. That alliance, of course, was based
upon opposition to a common enemy. It was an alliance that did not
outlast the defeat of that enemy. Today the progress toward democratic
institutions in the Soviet Union has given us an opportunity to build a
lasting set of new relationships, this time based upon shared interests
and shared values among the peoples and governments of our countries.
Working constructively with Russia and the other new
independent states is in the overwhelming interest of the United States.
The stakes are just enormous. The question is not whether we will engage
with Russia, but how.
From the outset, President Clinton has pursued a policy of
pragmatic engagement with Russia and the other new independent states.
We've been able to provide critical support for political and economic
reform in these countries, and, as a result, we are a safer nation than
we were two years ago than at the present time.
The United States and Russia have cooperated very
successfully on matters that are of vital importance to every American.
I personally worked with Russia on a wide range of interests, a wide
range of issues that are of great interest to the people of the United
States, from peace in the Middle East, to troop withdrawals from the
Baltics, to the agreements Ukraine and Kazakhstan and Belarus to have
them give up their nuclear weapons, to discussions on the arresting of
North Korea's nuclear weapon. Now, to give another example, we are
working very closely with Russia on the indefinite extension of the
nonproliferation treaty.
Pragmatic engagement with Russia means that we'll continue
to cooperate with them where our interests coincide and to manage our
differences candidly and constructively where they do not coincide. We,
obviously, face a number of important new challenges in what is and
always will be a very complicated set of relationships. However complex
they are, we certainly are not nostalgic for the Cold War. Today, every
difference of view that emerges is not a crisis. When Russia's actions
threaten our interests, we will continue to speak openly, appropriately
and to act constructively. We'll be finding solutions with them, with a
common aim to find those solutions.
The support that we have given Russia over the period of our
administration have been more than justified by the results that we have
achieved. We'd be very short-sighted to withdraw our support just
because we didn't agree on every single issue. It's essential that we
remain steady and patient, with a clear sense of perspective.
To encourage pluralism in Russia, we continue to deal with
Russia as a pluralistic society. In that vein, the President, when he's
in Moscow, will meet with a range of Russian leaders, particularly those
who are committed to reform. In his televised speech at Moscow State
University, the President will pay tribute to the tremendous effort the
Russian people have made to achieve political and economic change. He'll
encourage them to stay the course, despite the pain and frustration of
what they're going through.
Any lasting relationship -- the President strongly believes
any lasting relationship with Russia must be based upon a solid
relationship with the Russian people, and that is the fundamental reason
why he has decided to go to Russia for the commemoration for this
important event.
In his meetings with President Yeltsin on the second day of
the trip, the President will be addressing a number of issues based upon
our pragmatic engagement and our new ability in this post- Cold War
period to deal with Russia in a business-like and constructive way on the
issues that we can agree on and those that divide us. We'll be focusing
in particular on our continuing effort to strengthen European security.
As you know, the President has put forth a comprehensive
program for the strengthening of OSCE, for the invigoration of the
partnership for Peace, for the establishment for a special relationship
between Russia and NATO and to continue on the steady, careful path of
NATO expansion. It's important to recognize that these initiatives have
given Russia's new democracies, those who are now members of the
Partnership For Peace, a very tangible incentive to complete their
post-communist transformation, to reform their military establishments,
and to stay on the path to democracy and market reform.
In his visit to Moscow, the President will be reiterating
that NATO's enlargement is moving forward deliberately and openly. He
will stress it's in Russia's interest to have a constructive dialogue
with NATO and to not isolate itself from the mainstream of Europe. The
path to NATO-Russia engagement is open. We will be making the point to
Russia that it is their decision to make. Full participation in the
Partnership For Peace and the signing of the separate document between
Russia and NATO would be the best way for Russia to move forward.
The President will also be discussing a number of arms
control issues, and Secretary Perry will be alluding to those in somewhat
more detail. Let me touch on one, and that is cooperation with Iran on
nuclear matters, to which we are opposed.
The President will stress our strong conviction that any
nuclear cooperation with Iran poses very serious risks for Russia, poses
most serious risks for undermining the Middle East peace process,
interferes with our aim to stop nuclear proliferation, and the point
we'll be making most firmly, it's in Russia's own interest to cease this
nuclear cooperation with Iran.
In the course of those discussions, the President will be
reviewing certain very sensitive information concerning Russia's --
pardon me -- concerning Iran's true intentions. He'll be reminding
President Yeltsin that none of the G-7 countries feel that it's safe to
cooperate with Iran on nuclear matters. To put it simply, Iran has no
legitimate basis for trying to develop a nuclear reactor program. We
hope that over time the Russians will come to share this conclusion that
we feel so deeply.
President Clinton will also have an opportunity to express
his concern over the very recent reports that the Russian Atomic Energy
Ministry has indicated that it has made a tentative agreement to sell
gas, centrifuges to Iran, and to engage in extensive training of Iran's
nuclear physicists. This effort in our judgment would contribute
directly to the nuclear capability in Iran, to its bomb making
capability. And the President wants to make it clear that he feels that
this should be halted at once.
Of course, we understand that Russia has an economic
interest in this kind of cooperation, but we feel that the President's
decision to ban U.S. trade and investment in Iran shows that we're
prepared to make sacrifices to halt the nuclear march by Iran and its
support for terrorism. And we hope that over time Russia will come to
agree with us in this conclusion.
Turning to another subject, the President will restate our
concerns about the conflict in Chechnya and urge an end to the quest
there by Russia for a military solution. We believe that Russia should
implement a permanent cease-fire; that it should cooperate fully with the
OSCE assistance group that's now operating there; and also to allow the
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian goods, medicines and foods and the
like. As long as it continues this tragic struggle in Chechnya it will
have, I think, adverse implications for Russia's democracy, as well as
getting Russia a bad name in international circles.
I want to emphasize the importance of the President's stop
in Kiev. It will be the second time within six months that the President
has met with President Kuchma. Last year, under President Kuchma, has
been a landmark year for Ukraine. It's given up its nuclear weapons and
it's acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty. It held three presidential
elections, and saw a peaceful transfer of power, launched a program of
economic reform. And I must say that the effort the United States has
made to assist Ukraine has been an effort that I think has paid very big
dividends for the United States. And it is well worthwhile.
With Ukraine's reform now on track, the President's aim in
this particular meeting will be to lay out a new U.S.-Ukraine agenda
based upon expanded trade and investment. We want to strengthen our
economic and security ties, and have an expanded cooperation in space and
science.
Despite a host of problems, Ukraine is making strong steps
in the right direction and I think it justifies our support; indeed, it
justifies expanded support. The President has been working hard to get
ready for this trip. Both of the last two evenings we've had long
sessions going over the difficult agenda that I have just spelled out for
you. I think the President regards it as extremely important trip, and I
think the preparation has reflected the seriousness with which he is
addressing this.
Now, may I turn to Secretary Perry.
SECRETARY PERRY: Thank you very much, Secretary
Christopher. Last month I visited Ukraine and Russia for the purpose of,
first of all, as a preparation for the summit meeting, but even more
importantly, just part of our regular engagement with Russia on matters
of security interest.
I want to emphasize that we cooperate with Russia on
security issues of mutual interest to both countries. In my visit, about
90 percent of our time was spent developing more and more effective ways
of cooperating in these areas of mutual interest. About 10 percent of
the time was spent discussing problem areas in security and trying to
find ways of resolving those issues. I give you those two percentages
because the media reporting on the visit all dealt with the 10 percent,
in the problem area, nothing on the 90 percent which was the -- and what
I'd like to do briefly today is describe to you a little bit what the
other 90 percent is and give you some basis for judging whether it is
worth our concentration of effort in these areas.
The areas of cooperation, where we have mutual interests,
first of all, preventing the re-emergence of a nuclear threat between
Russia and the United States. Secondly is preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical to rogue
nations to terrorists which could threaten both of our countries. The
third is cooperation on military exercises, peacekeeping, search and
rescue operations, humanitarian relief. We've already had four or five
such joint exercises.
We have a few more planned for this year -- confidence
building, detailed meetings, military-to-military, defense-to-defense
officials. And all of these form the basis of our very detailed
engagement which we have with the Russians in the security area.
Now, in this field, let me just take one of the areas, which
is the nuclear area, and describe to you the progress that's being made
in that area, the things we're discussing, the things we have underway.
Already we have eliminated 2,400 nuclear warheads -- 2,400
nuclear warheads have been removed from the missiles and the strategic
bombers in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan; 600 missiles and
bombers have been dismantled. Now, both the United States and Russia are
well ahead of the schedule on this dismantlement that's called for in the
START I Treaty. Indeed, Russia reports just this past week that the last
nuclear weapon has left Kazakhstan, and that Kazakhstan is now a
nuclear-free state. Ukraine and Belarus will be free of nuclear weapons
next year.
Now, to put that in some perspective for you, I visited last
year, Pervomaysk, which is in the Ukraine, one of the premiere ICBM sites
in the former Soviet Union. And at that time there were 700 nuclear
weapons at that one site, all targeted to cities in the United States. A
year from now that whole site will just be wheat fields. All of the
weapons, all of the silos, all of the launches will be gone.
I wanted to show you two pictures I took on this last trip
to illustrate this dismantlement. This is a picture that was taken in
Russia at the Engels Air Base, which is where they have the dismantlement
of their bombers underway under START I and under the CFE Treaty. There
are almost 100 bombers in various states of dismantlement at this air
base. It is truly an awesome site to see this.
What you see here is a Bear bomber being sawed up into
little pieces by a Russian. We have sent equipment to them to facilitate
and to speed up this whole process, including huge crushers and shearing
machines, and a most dramatic machine called a guillotine, which chops
the wings off of airplanes in a mass production basis.
The next picture shows a scene at the Pervomaysk. This is
an SS-19 ICBM, which was removed from the silo while we were there and
taken for destruction. On my previous visit there we saw the warheads
being taken off the SS-24 ICBM. This is the site which I said had 700
warheads a year ago, and a year from now will be nothing but wheat
fields.
The point I make on emphasizing this program is that we do
have disagreements with Russia in the security field. But in this core
area of cooperation that is so important us, it is strong and it is
producing results, and we must stay engaged with Russia to continue this
process.
Clinton-Yeltsin summits not only perform this engagement,
they have helped to keep this reduction of the nuclear threat on track,
indeed, they have brought about an acceleration of it. So there is
nothing more important to our security relationship than keeping this
nuclear reduction on track and underway, and this is a key part of our
engagement with Russia today.
Bob.
SECRETARY RUBIN: Thank you, Bill. This is not an economic
summit. On the other hand, as Secretary Christopher said, economic
policy is integrally related to foreign policy. And I might add as an
aside that that's reflected in the really excellent working relationship
that the economic team has with the foreign policy team in this
administration. For Russia and for the Ukraine, economic reform clearly
lies at the heart of political reform, social reform, and all of the
objectives that this administration is seeking to achieve.
There is an impression abroad, I think, that Russia has had
a very difficult time economically, and clearly, there are many very
serious problems. On the other hand, an enormous amount has been
accomplished. Prices are free, industry has been privatized -- something
like 12,000 of the largest companies have been privatized under the first
stage of the privatization program -- and well over half -- and I think
this is the most striking statistic of all -- in the roughly four years
of economic reform, well over half of GDP is in the private sector.
Moreover, while GDP has fallen, real income has risen, and
the reconciliation of those two numbers is number one, GDP does not
include -- or their GDP statistics do not pick up much of what goes on in
the private sector; secondly, a lot of what has been lost has been
military and other production that has not been part of the real income
of the Russian people.
Having said all that, what an enormous amount has been
accomplished, a great deal remains to be done. For one thing, Russia
needs to build confidence in its reform effort into consistency. We are
very encouraged by Russia's 1995 economic program which, with our
support, earned an IMF standby program of $6.8 billion. On the other
hand, if you go back over the last three years, what you had is a number
of programs that have started out with great hope in the macroeconomic
stabilization area and then been dashed. In our judgment, 1995 is clearly
a pivotal year for economic reform in Russia.
In the spirit of supporting that reform, we will continue to
support IMF, World Bank lending. We have taken leadership in the G-7
with respect to rescheduling the 1995 debt rescheduling. And if Russia
sticks with this program -- and this is an enormous incentive in addition
to the IMF program for sticking with reform -- if Russia sticks with
this program, then we will support next year multiyear rescheduling of
Russia's debt.
While we're in Russia we will also discuss tax policy and
the legal foundations for private markets, both of which are critical for
Russia's economy as it goes forward. Russia's capital markets are
substantially underdeveloped. We think there is an enormous amount that
we can do to help them work through the requisites for effective capital
markets.
It's very interesting -- the entire value, or market
valuation of Russia's top 50 companies is $20 billion. That's less than
quite a number of the largest companies, individual companies, market
capitalization in the United States.
Secretary Christopher mentioned the Ukraine, and it tends to
get a little bit overlooked as people look forward to this trip. But the
Ukraine is extremely important. They began down the road of economic
reform later than Russia, but as Secretary Christopher said, since
President Kuchma's election last summer, Ukraine has embraced bold
reforms and has begun freeing its economy from the strictures of the
past. A solid start has been made in the Ukraine. That was responsible
for securing the IMF support for $1.5 billion standby program. The G-7
in Naples pledged to support $4 billion from the IMF, World Bank, and
various bilateral sources over a two-year period. Already $2.7 billion
has been committed, and there are commitments for a further $1 billion.
We are very actively involved in working with Russia and
very actively involved in working with the Ukraine on the requisites for
economic reform in both countries. Thank you.
Q One item -- perhaps, Secretary Perry --conventional
weapons. During the last summit the two Presidents agreed there would be
no new Russian arms deals with Iran, but existing contracts could be
fulfilled. It turned out some had three years to go and involved
submarines. I don't know if you've ever gotten the list. I wish you
would tell us what they're going to do. And can you whittle that down
any -- technicians and experts go along with those, as well, don't they,
as well as with nuclear deals? Isn't there any alarm or concern there?
Didn't you let them off a little too easy last time?
SECRETARY PERRY: They're about halfway done with those
contracts. Let's take the nuclear -- or the diesel electric submarines,
for example. Two of them have been delivered; a third is to be
delivered. That's typical of the status.
We do not see cause for concern on the level and the nature
of conventional arms being transferred. We would prefer they not be
transferred, but we're -- quite satisfied with the agreement not to
continue transfer.
The Russians have a very, very substantial capability in
conventional arms and in conventional arm technology. And it would give
us a very substantial problem if they were to make a free transfer of
those to the Iranians. So I'd like to focus on the positive side of
that, which is their agreement to cut that off after those present
contracts.
Maybe Secretary Christopher would like to add to that.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I'd add to that by saying that
we hope that Russia will join the so-called COCOM regime which is an
agreement that we've entered into with our European allies and I think
the only thing that stands between Russia joining, that is,working out
the arrangements with respect to their sales to Iran, those negotiations
are going forward. The Vice President has been exchanging information
with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on that subject, and we're hoping we can
bring Russia into COCOM so as to regularize and limit their conventional
weapons transfers in the future.
Q Mr. Secretary, you talked about the pressure the
President intends to use on the Iranian deal -- the gas centrifuge and
the lightwater reactors. But you didn't really talk about whether or not
the U.S. is able to say that there will be consequences for the
relationship if Russia goes forward with this deal, and I wondered if you
might tell us whether there will be any consequences?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, let me back up just a step or
two on that. As I said in my statement, the United States believes that
there is no legitimate basis for Iran to seek a nuclear reactor. They do
not have a shortage of energy, and so we deduced that they are seeking a
nuclear reactor program is because they have intentions to create a
nuclear weapons capability and that's confirmed by our other -- other
information that we have.
We intend to make that information available to the
Russians. We have all ready done a good deal of that, and I'm sure that
will be a focus of the conversation between President Yeltsin and
President Clinton. I answer the question in that way as a beginning
because we think it's strongly in the interest of Russia to prevent Iran
from developing a nuclear weapons capability. Why in the world they'd
want to have a near neighbor developing a nuclear weapons capability with
the reputation that Iran has for recklessness?
Now, beyond that, as you know, we've recently learned that
Russia is considering the sale of gas centrifuge equipment to Iran, I
think, which only can confirm what the intentions of the Iranians are.
Another very strong reason for encouraging them not to go forward. The
United States will be making those arguments in the strongest terms. We
understand that Russia has a economic interest in this sale, but the
decision the President took last Sunday, I think, puts him in a very good
position to argue to the Russians that they ought to recognize that
sacrifice the United States is making and make a similar sacrifice over
time.
As I have said on other occasions, the extent to which
Russia is welcomed into the institutions of the West, such as G-7, I
think, will depend upon the perceptions of their conduct in matters such
as their relationships with Iran, as well as their situation in Chechnya.
I think they have all ready suffered considerably in the international
community by reason of their actions. The European Union, the Council of
Europe have all taken cognizance of what they are doing, and I think that
is the principal basis that we would have at the present time for urging
them not to go ahead -- plus their own self interest, which is the
strongest reason of all.
Q So, if I could just follow up, you're then saying that
the United States will not say, if you go forward with this, then the
U.S. is prepared to do that?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I think that the United States has
such a broad relationship with Russia that we should not make any single
the issue the talisman of that relationship. We should not hold the
whole relationship hostage to any single issue, important as that issue
is. But we'll have a strong basis for making these arguments. We'll
continue to make them over time.
Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two-part question. I
would like to ask what decisions does President Yeltsin have to make
right in this -- that it's possible to ease the relationship and overcome
some of these problems? And Secretary Perry, I would like to ask you, is
NATO a military organization? And if it is, why shouldn't Russia feel
threatened if you want to expand? I mean, who's the enemy?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: As you know from things you've read,
President Yeltsin has reserved to himself many of the major decisions in
connection with the forthcoming summit.
We're not expecting any great series of breakthroughs.
We're not expecting all the outstanding problems to be resolved. What we
do expect and are certain we will have is an opportunity to have a
serious engagement with Russia, a serious discussion.
I think that we can expect to call their attention to
matters that they maybe have not perhaps fully considered in the past.
There are steps that can be taken on many of the issues that would be
positive from the standpoint of the relationship. But I would urge you
not to judge this particular meeting, this particular summit by tangible
progress on 8, 10 issues. I would urge that it be judged on whether or
not we've had a solid engagement, whether we've been able to exchange
views, whether there has been a recognition of the positions that we're
putting forward.
But, that being said, I would hope that by the time we
return, by the time of the end of next week, we'll have solid progress on
several of the issues.
SECRETARY PERRY: I have said many times to Russian leaders
that NATO poses no threat to Russia, and NATO does not see Russia as a
threat to it. What NATO does today and what its members perceive that it
does today is create a zone of security and stability in Europe. And the
reason all 16 of the NATO members continue to participate in NATO is
because they believe that zone of security and stability is important and
they want to be a part of it.
We have discussed with Russia and recommended to Russia
things they can do to participate in that zone. The first and most
important is to become not only a full-fledged member of the Partnership
For Peace, a participant in the Partnership For Peace, but be a leader in
the Partnership For Peace and taking initiative in joint exercises, for
example.
And, secondly, to form a security agreement with NATO,
forming what could be, for example, a consultative commission which
discusses security issues of mutual interest between NATO and Russia.
All of that would tend to bring Russia into this same zone of security
and stability.
Q Secretary Christopher, are you satisfied that all this
public pressure on Mr. Yeltsin on these transactions with Iran has not
had the unintended consequence of making it harder for him to give ground
on these things, instead of the other way around?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I see the public attention to this
as being a very positive factor. My own feeling is that we brought to
President Yeltin's attention -- and President Clinton will have an
opportunity to do so even more -- some facts that perhaps he wasn't fully
aware of. I think that the proposed sale of the gas centrifuge plants by
the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry is something that deserves the
greatest attention, which I have reason to believe perhaps had not in the
past.
So, no, I see it as a very positive factor. I want to
emphasize that the decision the President took with respect to Iran was
one that we hope will have a long-term effect. We do not expect
miracles. We did not expect at the time the President took the decision
that all of our allies would say we're going to take an exactly similar
position. But we do think it enhances our capability to speak with not
only the Russians, but also the other countries that might be trading
with Iran and urge them not to give concessionary credits, and certainly
not to engage in nuclear cooperation.
Q trying private quiet diplomacy on this first, or not?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, we certainly have been talking
with the Russians about it over the last many months. But I think that
this kind of a dialogue between our two countries is a positive,
constructive matter. These are matters of importance to the Russian
people, as well as the Russian government. So I would see no basis for
trying to conduct these discussions purely in secret. It seems to me
desireable that there be a transparency about these matters, both as to
what Russia intends to do, as well as the opposition the United States
has.
Q Secretary Christopher or Secretary Perry, news reports
coming out of Russia today seem to indicate the Russians will give Cuba
nuclear collaboration. Have you heard anything about it?
SECRETARY PERRY: Pardon me? Give Cuba --
Q Cuba seems to have an installation --
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I've not seen those reports today.
Q Secretary Christopher, Sergei Kovalev is in town, as you
know, and has spoken with a number of top administration officials and
expressed concern that the President and the administration have not
spoken out forcefully enough on Chechnya, and is suggesting even that
Clinton's appearance in Moscow at this time amounts to acquiescence in
the Russian activity there and military actions there. What is your
response to that and, again, to follow Rita's question, what will be the
consequences of Russia's continued assault on Chechnya people?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, let me emphasize first that
from the very beginning, going back to last December 17th, as soon as the
Chechnya exercise began we spoke out against it. I spoke out against it
in the very earliest days, calling for them to stop the endeavor and to
respect human rights in connection with that. Our position has been
consistent on that all the way through.
The Deputy Secretary and I met yesterday with Mr. Kovalev.
We had a good discussion with him about what might be done in Chechnya
and I continue to think that it's desirable for the President to engage
on that subject. I think we have a pragmatic engagement with Russia and
the essence of that is to be able to discuss matters where we differ.
So I think it's desirable the President be able to meet face
to face with President Yeltsin and to make clear to him the disadvantage
that that conflict is to Russia, both in terms of its relationships, as
well as its relationships in the international community. I don't have
any question but that we have made clear our views and will continue to
make clear our views. And I think that Mr. Kovalev, who has performed
many respect heroically in this matter and has to recognize that the
United States is doing what it can to try to ensure that this conflict
comes to an end.
As far as the penalties, I can only repeat that the trend of
Russia's acceptance into Western institutions will be importantly
influenced by the way they conduct themselves in such matters as
Chechnya, as well as others. They've come a long way toward integration
into Western institutions, but I think the extent to which they take the
next steps -- for example, with respect to the G-7 -- are going to be
importantly influenced by their conduct in such matters as Chechnya.
Q There's been some hope within the administration that by
the time the two Presidents met again both countries would have ratified
START II. What is your assessment now of the prospects with the Russian
Parliament ratifying the treaty, and how do you believe public pressure
on issues like Chechnya and Iran has affected that?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, as far as the United States is
concerned, I think we're proceeding in an orderly way. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has completed its hearings, and it seems to
me that we're moving toward ratification, with the leadership of Senator
Lugar, who is the Chairman Pro Tem on this issue.
We've had an unusually good opportunity within the last
several days with a delegation of the top members of the Duma here. I've
met with them, and Secretary Perry has met with them, and they've
indicated that they're going to proceed with the ratification of START
II. They think it will be a considerable process. Hearings have not
begun, but nevertheless, I think they are determined to move ahead on
this. I think it will take a substantial period of time to do that, but
nevertheless, I don't see any signs that they do not feel as we do that
that particular treaty is in the self-interest of both of the nations.
And we're proceeding down that track.
Q Mr. Secretary, just to follow up on that, there's talk in
Russia that the Duma would like to modify the treaty. Can you accept any
modifications?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: We don't see any basis for modifying
the treaty. And those members of the Duma that I talked to and Secretary
Perry talked to talked about ratifying the treaty in its present form. I
can't exclude the fact that there's some individual members of the Duma
who might want to modify the treaty, just as there might be in any
parliamentary body. But we're considering that very important treaty in
its present terms.
Secretary Perry, you don't have any different view of that,
do you? (Laughter.)
SECRETARY PERRY: Not on your life. (Laughter.)
No, I discussed with the three leaders of the Duma just the
day before yesterday this very question, and they are moving ahead
vigorously to try to get a ratification of this treaty just as we are.
My estimate is it's going to take them longer than it takes us because
they're not as far along in the process. They have -- as Secretary
Christopher indicated -- they have not even started hearings yet.
I do expect proposals from some members of the Duma for
changes in it. My belief is that those proposals will not prevail and
that there will be an up or down vote on it -- on the treaty as proposed.
And I believe that vote will ultimately be successful. What I cannot
forecast is when that's going to happen. Hopefully, we hope and the Duma
members I talked with also hope it will be done before the parliamentary
elections coming up later this year.
Q Back to Iran. Will you be satisfied for the purposes of
this summit if the Russians would agree to put aside the sale of the gas
centrifuges, would you consider that a significant accomplishment?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Not at all. We would not be
satisfied by that. The nuclear cooperation reflected by the reactor sale
and the technology that would go with that, the scientists that would
accompany it, seems to us to be a step in the wrong direction toward the
creation of a nuclear weapons capability.
Now, let me divide that part of it from the recent
information about the gas centrifuge sale, which seems to us to confirm
what Iran's intentions are. It's a very strong reason for not going
forward with the program in any respect. I want to emphasize that we're
not expecting great breakthroughs at this time. We expect this would be
a process that will continue over time, but we hope to persuade the
Russians over time that this nuclear cooperation with Iran is very
strongly not in their self-interest and that we hope the whole program
will be brought to an end.
Q Secretary Rubin, can you give us some specific examples
of agreements or ways and means in which the President is going to help
the Russians along or move the process of economic reform along on this?
SECRETARY RUBIN: I don't think there will be particular
agreements coming out of this trip. But the Russian -- we met with
Deputy Prime Minister Chubays when he was here for the G-7 meeting, and
he -- there's a very strong and understandable interest in pursuing debt
rescheduling, as I mentioned. And we'll be discussing that when we're in
Moscow in a separate set of meetings.
There is great interest in Russia in developing capital
markets, and we'll be working with them, providing technical assistance
in capital markets. I think there are a lot of issues with respect to
the tax structure and various other components of an architecture that
you need if you're going to have economic reform. It's not a question of
individual agreements, it's a question of continuing our work with them
in these various areas.
Q Do you know if either the Cyprus and the Kurdish issue
will be an agenda of the summit?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Cyprus?
Q And the Kurds.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I have not seen the Cyprus issue on
the agenda of the summit. It's entirely possible that the Kurdish issue
will be discussed in connection with the Turkish action in Iraq. But I
think the mention of those two subjects is an indication of just how rich
the agenda might be, and I want to emphasize that the two Presidents only
have the second day and perhaps a small part of the third day in which
they might meet. And they'll have a very full plate with the issues that
I mentioned.
Q spent fuel from the reactors? There's a report just now
from the U.N. -- Iranian sources saying the fuel would be returned to
Russia. Is that part of some bargain? Does that help at all?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Spent fuel from which reactor?
Q From those reactors that they provide, the reactors that
the Russians provide. That the fuel be taken back to Russia --
apparently willing to concede that.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: We're hearing a number of reports
about ways in which the program might be scaled back or things that might
be done. Frankly, we think the entire nuclear cooperation program should
be brought to an end because it really reflects the desire on the part of
the Iranians to move to a weapons capability. And although there may be
some desirable changes like this which would be welcome standing alone,
nevertheless, I think our aim and our expectation is that we will be
making the argument in the broadest terms and will not be ultimately
satisfied by anything other than the end of the nuclear cooperation
program, which I want to emphasize all members of the G-7 have ended as
far as cooperation with Iran goes.
Q You said that you recognize that Russia has economic
interests here and that's one of their motivations. Is there anything
you can do to replace the money that they'd make from the sale?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Let me say two things about that.
First, since ending this program is in the self-interest of Russia, I
would not think that they needed that kind of incentive. But we do
recognize they do have an economic interest. If they go forward with
this program, it would be virtually impossible for us to have peaceful
nuclear cooperation with Russia which would be a benefit to them. If the
program comes to an end it will open the door to considerably greater
peaceful nuclear cooperation which could be to their financial advantage.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END3:05 P.M. EDT
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