United Nations A/56/723-S/2001/1222
Original: English
General Assembly Fifty-sixth session Agenda item 62 Question of Cyprus |
Security Council Fifty-sixth year |
|
Letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to a letter from the Permanent Representative of Turkey (A/56/451-S/2001/953) dated 9 October 2001, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a further opinion, dated 17 November 2001, prepared by three prominent international jurists and professors of international law, James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge, Gerhard Hafner, Professor of International Law, University of Vienna, and Alain Pellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris-X, on the eligibility of the Republic of Cyprus to become a member of the European Union (see annex).
Their first opinion, dated 24 September 1997, was circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/52/481-S/1997/805), dated 17 October 1997.
I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.
(Signed)
Sotirios Zackheos
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
Annex
The
Eligibility of the Republic of Cyprus for EU Membership
Summary
1.
In an Opinion of 24
September 1997 which was circulated as a Security Council and General
Assembly document,[1]
the three undersigned advised that Cyprus was eligible, as a matter of
international law, to become a member of the European Union, and that
its becoming a member would not violate any existing treaty obligation
of Cyprus.
2.
In particular we
advised that:
¨
Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee does not prohibit
Cyprus from becoming a member of a regional economic organisation such
as the European Union. Membership
of the EU would not constitute participation “in any political or
economic union with any State whatsoever” within the meaning of
Article 1 paragraph 2.
¨
Article 50 of the Constitution of 1960 (which requires participation by
the Vice-President in treaty-making) could not subsequently be invoked
by Cyprus as a basis for invalidating its consent to be bound by the EU
treaties.
¨
Likewise, Article 170 of the Constitution (which requires
most-favoured-nation treatment for Turkey in respect of certain treaties
of Cyprus) does not constitute a barrier to Cyprus’ entry, for a
number of reasons. Perhaps
the most important of these is that EC membership is not regarded as
triggering general most-favoured-nation obligations, under the GATT/WTO
or otherwise. Turkey as a
GATT/WTO member and applicant for EU membership is well aware of this
practice. Thus Article 170 would not require Cyprus to extend any
additional benefits of EU membership to Turkey.
This
advice conforms with what is now the generally accepted position.
The European Union itself has acted on the same basis, and
accession negotiations have been in progress for some time.
3.
By a letter of 5
October 2001, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United
Nations forwarded a Further Opinion by Professor Maurice Mendelson QC,
dated 12 September 2001.[2]
The reasons given by Professor Mendelson for adhering to his
earlier view that Cyprus’s admission to the EU would be “illegal”
do not, however, involve any new arguments supporting that conclusion.
We set out below the reasons for maintaining — as the EU itself
maintains — that there is no legal impediment to the admission of
Cyprus.
4.
By Article I (2) of the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus undertook
“not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic
union with any State whatever or partition of the Island”.
By Article II (2), Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom agreed
“to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at
promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other
State or partition of the Island”. The question is whether the accession of Cyprus to the EU
would involve “union of Cyprus with any other State”.
5.
In our earlier
opinion, we concluded that Articles I (2) and II (2) are irrelevant to
Cyprus’ EU eligibility, for the following reasons:
(a)
On their literal interpretation, these Articles are not concerned with
membership in regional economic associations but union with another
State (“with any State whatever”).
The term “State” was deliberately used in the singular.
(b)
The purpose of these Articles was to prevent the union of Cyprus, or of
any part of Cyprus, with Greece or Turkey, as well as the partition of
the Island. It was not to
prevent Cyprus entering international organizations, including regional
economic unions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) or, now, the EU.
(c) This is confirmed by the travaux of the Treaty of Guarantee. As the Turkish delegate at the London Joint Committee assured the other negotiators, by Article I (2)
“it
was certainly not intended that Cyprus should be precluded from
membership of the [European] Free Trade Area or multilateral
organizations. What was
meant was that Cyprus should not be politically united with Greece or
Turkey, or even economically in the narrow sense of customs union; but
that could not really be said in a Treaty.”[3]
The use of the singular term “any other State” was clearly
deliberate. A contrast was
intended to be drawn between multilateral arrangements, including
economic organizations and free trade areas, on the one hand, and
political and/or economic unions with a single State (in fact, Greece or
Turkey), on the other hand.
(d)
This interpretation is further confirmed by the terms of the
Constitution of 1960, which is expressly referred to in the Treaty of
Guarantee. Article 185 (2)
of the Constitution also uses the singular “any other State” in the
prohibition on “integral or partial union”.
Articles 50 and 169 refer to and permit Cyprus to become a party
to international organizations and economic cooperation agreements. There is a clear contrast between multilateral international
organizations and economic cooperation with a number of States, on the
one hand, and the union of Cyprus with any particular State, on the
other hand.
(e)
In any event, arguments based on Articles I and II of the Treaty of
Guarantee misconceive the character of the European Union.
The EU is not a State. Membership
of the EU does not entail member States uniting with each other on any
individual basis. Under the
EU, France is not united with Germany, nor Britain with Sweden.
Cyprus as a member of the EU would not be united with any other
particular State. Yet it is
only Cyprus’ union with any other particular State which Articles I
and II of the Treaty of Guarantee prohibit.
In this context it should be stressed that according to Article 2
TEU, the principle of subsidiarity limits the competences of the EU so
that one cannot speak of a “common law-making process” with an
all-encompassing scope.[4]
Furthermore the EU has to respect the national identities of its
Member States according to Article 6 (3) TEU.
(f)
Our interpretation of Articles I and II is supported by the subsequent
practice of the parties to the Treaty of Guarantee. Thus neither the United Kingdom nor Turkey objected on that
ground when Cyprus entered into a customs union with the EEC in 1972.[5]
Turkey’s concerns at possible discrimination against Turkish
Cypriots were addressed by Article 5 of the Association Agreement of 19
December 1972.[6]
The situation of Cyprus under the Association Agreement and its
Protocols was subsequently addressed by the European Court of Justice in
1994, in terms which cast no doubt upon the legality of the situation so
far as the EU is concerned.[7]
(g)
This interpretation is also supported at the international level. The
European Commission has accepted that Cyprus is eligible for membership,[8]
and the Member States have so agreed, most recently in the agreement for
EU enlargement reached in conjunction with the Treaty of Nice.[9]
The Security Council has affirmed that a Cyprus settlement
“must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any
form of partition or secession” and has welcomed “the decision of
the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with
Cyprus” as “an important development that should facilitate an
overall settlement”.[10]
Obviously the Security Council does not regard the accession
negotiations as a breach of an essential condition of a Cyprus
settlement.
(h)
In addition we noted that Austria joined the EU in 1995, despite the
prohibition in Article 4 of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 against
its entering into “political or economic union with Germany in any
form whatever”. Neither
the European Commission nor any existing Member State argued that
Article 4 of the Austrian State Treaty prohibited Austrian membership of
the EU. Nor did the Soviet
Union (or the Russian Federation, after the break-up of the USSR); its
concern was with the neutrality of Austria.
6.
Thus the literal terms of Articles I and II of the Treaty of
Guarantee, interpreted in the light of their object and purpose, support
our conclusion. So too does the negotiating history of the Treaty, the
subsequent practice of the parties, and the unanimous opinion of the EU
Members as well as the European Commission.
Among States which are not members of the EU, only Turkey seems
to take the opposite position. Certainly
the Security Council does not, despite its continuing preoccupation with
the situation in Cyprus and with the preconditions for a settlement of
the Cyprus question which “must exclude union in whole or in part with
any other country or any form of partition or secession”.[11]
7.
In opposition to this
virtually unanimous view of Cyprus’ eligibility for membership,
notwithstanding the Treaty of Guarantee, Professor Mendelson makes a
number of arguments in his most recent opinion.
These include the following:
(a)
Applying the principle of literal interpretation, he argues that because
the EU is “an economic union, as well as (increasingly) a form of
political union”, therefore membership of the EU is prohibited.[12]
But literal interpretation requires one to interpret all the
words, not just some of them, and to interpret all the words together in
their context. The question
is not whether the EU is an economic union, but whether a State which
joins the EU is entering into an economic union “with another State”
within the meaning of the Treaty of Guarantee.
(b)
He argues that “in legal drafting in English” (and in French) the
singular includes the plural, so that Article I should be read as
prohibiting economic union “with any State or States”.[13]
But not even under the Acts Interpretation Act 1889 (UK) is there
a rule that the singular
includes the plural; it depends on the context.
And of course we are dealing with a treaty, albeit one drafted in
the English language. There
was a reason for the emphasis on the singular: the concern was political
or economic union of Cyprus with a single State (i.e., Greece) or of
part of Cyprus with another State (Turkey).
It was not a concern with such things as the European Free Trade
Agreement.
(c)
He argues that the veto provisions in Article 50 of the Constitution
show that “international organizations are
covered by the [Treaty of Guarantee] and, if both the two named States
are not members of the organization, by the veto”.[14]
This confuses the veto powers exercisable by an elected Turkish
Cypriot Vice-President and the rights of the three guarantor States
under Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee. If a treaty involves political or economic union with another
State, Cyprus may not enter into that treaty, even with the consent of
the Vice-President. Moreover
whether Turkey and/or Greece are parties to such a treaty is irrelevant
in terms of the application of Articles I and II of the Treaty of
Guarantee. Cyprus may not
enter into such a treaty, whatever the position of the other States may
be.
(d)
He then argues that the EU is an economic and political union of States,
even if it is not itself a State, and that in entering into the EU
Cyprus is entering into a union with each of those other States in just
the same way it would do if it entered into a federation.[15]
That argument assumes, of course, that we are wrong in
emphasising that Article I is limited to union with another particular
State rather than a large group. But
even on that assumption, it is not the case that Greece or the United
Kingdom would exercise authority in Cyprus as part of the EU.
The decisions and literature on the Maastricht Treaty, cited in
our earlier opinion, demonstrate that this is not the case.[16]
All sorts of international organizations involve coordination of
activity, the “joint” pursuit of “common” policies in the
political and economic field.[17]
The EU is no doubt a very advanced example, but it is not,
directly or indirectly, a vehicle for the exercise by one member State
or its officials of public authority over another.
The organs of the EU are not organs of any Member State or
States. The context of the
Treaty of Guarantee and related instruments show that, although there
were to be controls on Cyprus becoming a member of international
organizations including free trade areas, Article I was intended to
address the separate and much narrower issue of a union with another
State.
(e)
Then he argues that, even if EU entry would not involve political or
economic union with other States, it would “indirectly promote union
with another State or States”.[18]
Of course the phrase “or States” does not appear in Articles
I and II of the Treaty of Guarantee.
But in any event we fail to see what indirect
aim EU membership might have for Cyprus, i.e. how it would tend to
produce union with any other State or States, or what indirect
tendency it might foster which the Treaty of Guarantee seeks to
prohibit. No doubt in
1959-60, Turkey sought to vest in an organ elected by the Turkish
Cypriot community veto powers over joining organizations of which Turkey
is not a member. But — we
repeat — this separate Turkish aim was achieved by Article 50 of the
Constitution, and not by the Treaty of Guarantee’s prohibition on
political union. We discuss
this further in paragraphs 8-10 below.
8.
There is also
provided a note by Professor Mendelson dated 21 July 1997 in which he
dismisses the Austrian case as only superficially similar.
His main argument is that the other parties to the Austrian State
Treaty of 1955 waived the provisions of Article 4 at the time.
In other words, his view is that Austrian membership of the EU
would have been a breach of the Article 4 of the Austrian State Treaty
but for the consent of all the other parties to it.[19]
He does not cite any statement to that effect by any of the other
States parties, nor any of the extensive literature on the subject in
English or German.[20]
There is simply no evidence that the Soviet Union (or later the
Russian Federation) considered that it was waiving rights under Article
4 of the State Treaty, or that its individual consent to Austrian
accession was required. There
is no suggestion that the consent of the other States parties to the
Treaty of 1955 was sought or required to what would otherwise have been
a breach of Article 4. Russian
objections as articulated at the time concerned not Article 4 but the
issue of neutrality. Similarly,
Russian literature at the time of the accession stressed Austria’s
neutrality as a potential problem, but not Article 4.[21]
The European Commission did not believe that Article 4 presented
any difficulty, either.[22]
In short, Professor Mendelson cites no evidence in support of his
“waiver” theory, and we are aware of none.[23]
Article
50 of the 1960 Constitution
9.
A second issue
concerns Article 50 of the Constitution of 1960, which provides for the
President and Vice-President to have, separately and conjointly, a right
of veto in decisions concerning, inter alia, “foreign affairs, except the participation of the
Republic in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which
the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate”.
Unlike Articles I and II of the Treaty of Guarantee, which are
expressed as absolute prohibitions, Article 50 distinguishes between
international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and
Turkey are, and those in which they are not, parties.
It thus addresses what we understand to be Turkey’s essential
concern, which is that it does not wish Cyprus to become a party to the
EU before it does. In other
words, its real concern is one of timing, not the application of an
absolute prohibition.
10.
The difficulty, however, with
Article 50 is that it is presently inoperative since no person holds or
exercises the office of Vice-President, for reasons that are well known.[24]
The question is whether this fact prevents Cyprus from applying
to or becoming a member of the EU, and the answer is clearly no.
As Article 50 of the Constitution recognises, Cyprus has the
normal capacity of a State to enter into “international treaties,
conventions and agreements” and to become a member of all kinds of
international organizations and alliances.
It provides for a procedural veto on such decisions, the veto to
be cast within a prescribed period by a Vice-President elected under the
Constitution. In the
absence of a veto duly cast in accordance with Article 50, the decision
to accede is valid and effective. Nor
could Cyprus, if it did accede to the EU, subsequently rely on Article
46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a ground for
disputing the validity of its accession.[25]
The simple reason is that, in the absence of a veto cast by a
person holding the office of Vice President in accordance with the
Constitution, there is no breach, and certainly no manifest breach
within the meaning of Article 46.
11.
On this point, Professor
Mendelson emphasises the international aspect of the Cyprus
Constitution, the element of international guarantee involved, and the
overlap between the Constitution, especially Article 50, and the Treaty
of Guarantee.[26]
With some of this we agree, but it is hardly relevant to the
present point. There is a
clear distinction between the existence of an international guarantee
and the scope or application of particular provisions of a constitution
which is subject to the guarantee.
We have already pointed out the distinction between Article 50 of
the Constitution (which is an important procedural provision concerned
with treaty-making, even if it is for the time being inoperative) and
Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee which is a prohibition on the
making of a certain limited class of treaties at all, by any authority
in Cyprus whatever. Professor Mendelson elides the distinction entirely.[27]
Article
170 of the 1960 Constitution
12.
A third issue concerns Article
170 (1) of the 1960 Constitution, which entitles Greece, Turkey and the
United Kingdom to seek most favoured nation (mfn) treatment from Cyprus,
“by agreement on appropriate terms” in respect of “all agreements
whatever their nature may be.” It
has been argued that Cyprus as an EU Member will not be in a position to
comply with Article 170 so far as Turkey is concerned.
The short answer to this is that there is a general understanding
that entry to the EU does not trigger general mfn obligations of the
entrant so far as third States are concerned.
This is consistent with Article XXIV (5) of the GATT.[28]
It is a position which Turkey itself has accepted, both as a GATT
Member, as an applicant for EU membership, and in bilateral arrangements
with Cyprus.[29]
13.
In any event, Article 170 only
operates by agreement, which agreement has to be “on appropriate
terms”. Even if it were
applicable in principle to EU membership (which it is not), all Article
170 would do would be to call on the parties to reach agreement in
particular “on appropriate terms” for granting mfn treatment.
14.
Professor
Mendelson regards this issue as “subsidiary”,[30]
and we agree. He does not
argue that “the entry of Cyprus into the EU without Turkey would
violate some existing right of Turkey to MFN treatment”;[31]
again we agree. He does
however argue that Greece and Greek citizens will be advantaged in
Cyprus compared to Turkey and Turkish citizens, and to some extent this
is true. Our point was
that, purely as a question of law and of the application of Article 170,
entry into a regional economic union does not trigger mfn obligations,
and that Turkey itself accepts this.[32]
The economic disadvantages for Turkey of its non-membership of
the EU remain matters to be addressed at the level of policy by the EU,
as well as by Turkey.[33]
No doubt they will be, since the long-term interests of the
region can only be addressed by a policy of inclusion.
Conclusions
15. For the reasons we have given, we remain firmly of the opinion that there is no legal basis for the argument that Cyprus is prevented by the Treaty of Guarantee, or by any provisions of the Constitution of 1960, from becoming a member of the EU or from complying with its treaty obligations towards Turkey once it becomes a member.
James Crawford
Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge
Gerhard Hafner
Professor of International Law, University of Vienna
Alain Pellet
Professor of International Law, University of Paris-X
17 November 2001
[1]
J Crawford, A Pellet & G Hafner, “Republic of Cyprus:
Eligibility for EU Membership” (A/52/481, S/1997/805, 17 October
1997).
[2]
Circulated as A/56/451, S/2001/953.
An earlier opinion of 6 June 1997, and a supplementary note of
21 July 1997, are annexed.
[3]
London Committee on Cyprus, Corrected Minutes of the 26th
Meeting of the Committee of Deputies, LC (MD), 19 October 1959, p 6.
[4]
Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 24.
[5]
OJEC No L 133/1
(1973). There have been 6
amendments to the Agreement, most recently in 1987 (OJEC No L 393/13 (1987)) and 1995 (OJEC No L 278 (1995)). The
1987 Protocol initiated the second stage of association, with a view
to a complete customs union within 15 years (Art. 31).
[6]
The Turkish objections in 1972 are summarized in Europe
No 986, 16 February 1972. As
Professor Mendelson recognises, Turkey did not rely on Article I of
the Treaty of Guarantee. He argues that Turkey’s failure to object
should be overlooked because the 1972 Agreement was “a relatively
modest affair”: Further Opinion, para. 28. But this cannot be said
as to the 1987 Protocol; and anyway, even in 1972, there was a customs
union which, on his view, was prohibited by the Treaty of Guarantee.
[7]
R v Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd
[1994] ECR I-3087, 3131, 3133-4; 100 ILR 258, 297-9.
[8]
Commission of the European Communities, The
challenge of enlargement. Commission
opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for membership
(OJEC Supp 5/93) 7-8.
[9]
See Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union;
Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union, annexed to the
Treaty of Nice, 26 February 2001, OJEC, No C 80/1 (2001). See also Helsinki European Council,
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, para. 9 (b);
Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Cyprus
Progress towards Accession, Doc SEC (2001) 1745.
[10]
See Security Council Res. 1117 (1997), 27 June 1997.
For later resolutions on Cyprus, see e.g. SC Resns. 1354
(2001), 15 June 2001, 1331 (2000), 13 December 2000, 1251 (1999), 29
June 1999.
[11]
Security Council Res. 1251, 29 June 1999, para. 11.
[12] Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 10.
[13] Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 13.
[14] Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 17 (emphasis in original).
[15] Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 24.
[16]
J Crawford, A Pellet & G Hafner, “Republic of Cyprus:
Eligibility for EU Membership”, paras. 13-15.
[17]
Cf. Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 24.
[18] Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 25.
[19]
M. Mendelson, “Note on Austria’s Accession to the European
Union”, para. 1 and concluding para.
[20]
We referred to this material in 24-27 of our Opinion of 24
September 1997.
[21]
See, e.g., K.V. Voronov, “Chertvertoe rasshirenie ES: tormoz
ili stimul integracii?” (The fourth widening of the EC: brake or
stimulation of the integration?) in: MeiMO no. 8-96, Moscow 1996, 88).
[22]
See EC, Sec/91/1590 Final, 1 August 1991, summarised in Bull
EC 7/8-1991, 81, as cited in our Opinion of 24 September 1997,
para. 25.
[23] Professor Mendelson’s other arguments can be dealt with more
briefly. He seeks to
distinguish Article 4 of the Austrian State Treaty from the Treaty of
Guarantee because the former specifically mentions Germany whereas the
latter refers in general terms to “any other State”. But the
failure to mention Greece and Turkey specifically does not affect the
matter. As everyone knows
and as the travaux préparatoires show (see paragraph 4 (c) above), the problem
in 1959-60 was union with one of those States, especially Greece.
Then he argues that there has at least arguably been a
fundamental change of circumstances between 1955 and 1991.
But no party to the Austrian State Treaty has purported to rely
on fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for the termination
of the treaty, and as Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties makes clear, treaties do not automatically lapse on
grounds of fundamental change; the change has to be invoked by a
party. Finally he argues
that “two wrongs do not make a right”; of course we agree, but
that has nothing to do with the issue whether Austrian accession was a
breach of Article 4, and the fact is that none of the concerned
parties at the time so considered it.
[24]
They are briefly set out in our Opinion of 24 September 1997,
para. 29.
[25]
Under Art. 46 only the State whose fundamental rules as to
treaty-making have been manifestly breached can invoke the breach.
[26] Mendelson, Further Opinion, paras. 37-38.
[27] Professor Mendelson also raises the question whether the
breakdown of Article 50 may be “wholly or mainly the fault of the
Greek Cypriot majority”: Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 37. For
our part, we have sought to avoid controversy on historical issues of
the 1960s. Most observers
would say that there was fault on all sides, including both
communities within Cyprus. In
any event, whatever the responsibility of the various actors
(including the three Guarantors) for the constitutional and
international crisis of that period, the issue is the conduct of the
foreign policy of Cyprus at the present time, and the international
law on this point is as we have stated it.
[28]
See also the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994, in WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The
Legal Texts (Geneva, 1994) 31.
[29]
Cyprus-Turkey, Trade Agreement, 9 November 1963, Art. 1. See
also the identically phrased Trade Agreement between Greece and
Cyprus, 24 August 1962.
[30] Mendelson, Further Opinion, para. 39.
[31]
Ibid.
[32]
So, apparently, does Professor Mendelson; at least he does not
argue the contrary.
[33] Professor Mendelson also points to the difficulties of applying
EU law uniformly within Cyprus: Further Opinion, para. 42.
We understand this issue is being addressed in the accession
negotiations. Again,
however, it is not a legal barrier to eligibility.