As delivered
Briefing to the Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr Alvaro de Soto
June 8, 2004
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to
say a few words by way of introduction of the Secretary-General’s report on
his good offices mission on Cyprus, which is before the Council in document S/2004/437 dated 28 May 2004. I will be brief, since the report is
largely self-explanatory.
As the report makes
clear, the renewed effort which began on
The Foundation Agreement contained in the plan was submitted to separate simultaneous referenda on 24 April 2004. It was rejected on the Greek Cypriot side by a margin of three to one, and approved on the Turkish Cypriot side by a margin of two to one. The plan therefore did not enter into force. The final opportunity to ensure that Cyprus should accede to the European Union as a united country rather than divided has thus been missed.
Throughout the effort which began in late 1999, pursuant to Council resolution 1250, the goal has been to bring about a settlement through a decision of the people on each side. The people have at last decided for themselves. Their decision, on each side, must be respected.
While the ultimate outcome of the effort of the past four and a half years has not been a success, a great deal has nevertheless been achieved. Those achievements should be built upon, and a number of elements put in place, to keep alive the prospects of reconciliation and reunification in the future. The Security Council, which has so strongly backed the Secretary-General’s efforts, has an important role to play in this regard.
The Secretary-General has, for his part, made a number of observations in the concluding sections of his report. He has made clear that as long as the current standoff, as described in paragraph 91, remains, he does not see any basis for resuming his active good offices.
A broad and fundamental reassessment of the full range of United Nations peace activities in Cyprus, both good offices and peacekeeping, is timely. In his report on the United Nations Force in Cyprus, in S/2004/427, which is also before the Council, he has therefore outlined his intention to conduct a review, to be completed within three months, of UNFICYP’s mandate, force levels and concept of operations, in the light of the developments on the ground, the positions of the parties, and any views the Security Council might have.
The Secretary-General has also indicated his hope that Greek Cypriots will reflect on the outcome of this process in the coming months. We need to better understand the reasons for their strong rejection of the plan, which was based on the vision of the Security Council as formulated over a quarter of a century, if future efforts are to have any hope of bearing fruit and we need to know how the Greek Cypriot side sees the way forward. In particular, we need to know if questions of security and implementation were, indeed, the main concern, and if so what can be done by the Security Council to address them. The Secretary-General has encouraged the Council to stand ready to do so if those concerns can be articulated with clarity and finality. I should like to take this opportunity to clarify the meaning of the sentence in paragraph 83 of the Secretary-General’s report which reads: “What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.” The sole purpose of that sentence was to emphasize that what was rejected on 24 April was a comprehensive plan for a settlement, ready for implementation, with nothing further to be negotiated, rather than a mere framework or set of principles for future negotiations.
I should mention that the Secretary-General received late yesterday afternoon, from the Greek Cypriot side, a letter outlining comments regarding the Secretary-General’s report on his mission of Good Offices, and I believe it has been conveyed also to members of the Council pending its circulation as an official document. It goes without saying that given that it is a rather lengthy letter, we have not had tithe to study it. Obviously we stand ready to respond to questions that members of the Council might have in that regard either here and now or in another forum.
The Secretary-General has also welcomed the fact that the Turkish Cypriots, in approving the plan, have unequivocally signalled their commitment to reunification. This is more than a mere expression of good will for a solution to the Cyprus problem: the Turkish Cypriot people have clearly backed away from their search for a separate sovereign statehood. This is a fundamental turnabout in the direction taken by the Turkish Cypriot side for over two decades. The Secretary-General has therefore recommended to the Council that it should encourage the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey, to remain committed to that goal. The Secretary-General has called on the Council to give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development. The Secretary-General has chosen his words very carefully. The action that the Secretary-General recommends, I should emphasize, would be addressed to States. It is not meant to give state rights, state functions or state institutions of the so-called “TRNC”. Its purpose would not be to afford recognition or assist secession, but rather to promote reunification and reconciliation. This is about assisting the people in the north of Cyprus.
I wish to acknowledge the extensive and consistent efforts of many Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to reunify Cyprus. These have to continue. Civil society must play its role, and no doubt the European Union will give such efforts their support, as should the United Nations.
I should also like to take this opportunity to reiterate the Secretary-General’s praise for the effort made by nearly 300 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots involved in the technical discussions without whom the settlement plan would not have been complete. He is also grateful for the assistance of a team of some 50 United Nations experts, many seconded by the European Commission and other governments and institutions, notably Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United States of America, and the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the United Nations Development Programme/United Nations Office for Project Services and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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